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THE SPECIAL PUBLIC PURPOSE FORUM
AND ENDORSEMENT RELATIONSHIPS:
NEW EXTENSIONS OF GOVERNMENT
SPEECH
by MARY JEAN DOLAN*
INTRODUCTION
Government web sites, public art projects, festive light pole
banners, and outdoor special events - these new and expanding
phenomena energize our communities and enhance the quality of life.
All involve a growing, synergistic partnership between the public and
private sectors,' and all implicate the First Amendment. In some
circumstances, government makes selections among private speakers,
deciding who will participate or be subsidized, and in others,
government projects benefit from essential private financial support.
* Special counsel to the City of Chicago. J.D. Northwestern University; B.A. University of
Notre Dame. With sincere appreciation to Sheldon Nahmod, Lawrence Rosenthal,
Spencer Waller, and Daniel Hynan for their helpful comments on earlier versions of this
Article. The views expressed in this Article are entirely my own and should not be
attributed to the City of Chicago.
1. For a discussion of the many applications of this trend, see Martha Minow,
Partners Not Rivals?: Redrawing the Lines Between Public and Private, Non-Profit and
Profit, and Secular and Religious, 80 B.U. L. REV. 1061 (2000) (observing phenomenon
and analyzing its impact on school reform and hospital funding). Also see People for the
Ethical Treatment of Animals (PETA) v. Giuliani, 105 F. Supp. 2d 294, 328 (S.D.N.Y.
2000), affd, 2001 WL 1010004 (2d Cir. Sept. 5, 2001), which involved a public art event in
New York:
[T]he CowParade is the product of a public-private partnership entailing
investment of significant capital in the venture by a private entity. This form of
private involvement in the financing of public functions has become an
increasingly pervasive and significant means of underwriting programs and
events in which the general public has an important interest and from which the
state derives substantial benefits. This is true especially in the context of
dwindling public resources available for certain activities for which the
government may be reluctant to exercise its powers to tax the entire citizenry.
Id. at 328.
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Whether screening participants or sponsors, government seeks to
select those compatible with project goals and to avoid fostering
speech that divides communities, insults particular groups, or grates
on public sensibilities. Current judicial analysis of these complex
public-private relationships is inadequate in two ways. First, in these
proliferating contexts, even though government often has subjective
expressive goals, such as "showcasing the city's culture," courts
impose the "limited public forum" test, which bans values-based
choices among potential private speakers. Second, new cases have
allowed viewpoint-based decisions when it comes to government's
choice of sponsors for public expressive programs. These cases use
the "government speech" approach, but fail to provide a coherent
rationale.
The limited public forum test and the government speech
approaches are on a collision course. To understand the
contradictions illustrated by the two lines of cases requires a brief
overview of the two doctrines. Where an applicant is rejected from a
government program that involves speech, courts generally begin
their analysis of any First Amendment claim by using forum analysis,
which looks to the nature of the property at issue. In the "traditional
public forum," primarily the streets and parks, the "strict scrutiny"
test applies: no content-based restrictions on speech are allowed
unless necessary to serve a compelling state interest and narrowly
tailored to that end.2 When government invites private speakers to
use nonpublic property or public funds, however, it is a "limited
public forum" and a different rule applies. The "limited public
forum" test permits government to set reasonable content limitations
on the types of speakers and subject matter allowed, so long as the
limits are viewpoint neutral.'
While this test appears to give government substantial flexibility
to tailor public programs involving private speech, that promise has
often proved illusory, in part because the line between content and
viewpoint is quite faint.4 Litigated primarily in the contexts of transit
advertising and meeting room allocation, courts have required
content limits to be concrete and have rejected attempts to screen out
public controversy, hate groups, advocates of discrimination, and
2. See Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 46 (1983)
(establishing the forum analysis approach). Strict scrutiny also applies to content-based
distinctions where government opens its property up for speech generally. Id.
3. Id. at 55. See discussion infra Part I.A.
4. See infra Part I.B.
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religious practices. The only consistently successful method of
excluding divisive speech from a limited public forum has been
"commercial only" policies, which are relevant only in the advertising
setting.
In contrast, the "government speech" approach delivers that
flexibility. When government is deemed to be promoting its own
message, the viewpoint neutrality requirement (and reasonableness,
for that matter) disappears. Two distinct models of government
speech involve selection of private speech. Rust v. Sullivan5
established that government may express a particular substantive
policy, such as an anti-abortion stance, through private speakers.
There, the government did so by funding only those clinics which
agreed not to counsel on the abortion option.6 Under National
Endowment of the Arts v. Finlay,7 when government is engaged in a
necessarily discretionary selection process, such as allocating federal
arts funding on the basis of "artistic merit," it can incorporate values,
such as decency, as part of its evaluations.
This Article focuses first on the contexts that it will label the
"special public purpose forums." These are the projects and
programs where government has a subjective expressive purpose that
includes particular values and is carried out through selection of
private speakers. In these contexts, the government speech paradigm
should apply. Instead, in recent cases involving Internet links on a
municipal web site,8 honorary street signs,9 and sidewalk art,'° the
limited public forum test was applied by rote, despite its uneasy fit
with general criteria such as "promoting the city's tourism and
economic welfare" and "appealing to a broad-based audience." Such
standards cannot be applied free of viewpoint. Nominal application
of the limited public forum test at best creates an unpredictable legal
landscape for policy makers, and often will frustrate legitimate public
expressive intent. In only one case has a court explicitly faced the
dichotomy. It concluded, in dicta, that if a city funds only those
5. 500 U.S. 173 (1991).
6. Id. at 179.
7. 524 U.S. 569, 572-73 (1998). See also Ark. Educ. Television Comm'n v. Forbes,
523 U.S. 666 (1998) (involving public broadcasting content selection). See infra Part II.A.
8. See The Putnam Pit v. City of Cookeville, 221 F.3d 834, 838-39 (6th Cir. 2000).
9. See E. Timor Action Network, Inc. v. City of N.Y., 71 F. Supp. 2d 334, 336
(S.D.N.Y. 1999).
10. See PETA v. Giuliani, 105 F. Supp. 2d 294, 297 (S.D.N.Y. 2000), affd, 2001 WL
1010004 (2d Cir. Sept. 5, 2001).
11. See Gentala v. City of Tucson, 244 F.3d 1065 (9th Cir. 2001) (en banc), vacated by
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special events that best reflect the city's unique identity, that selection
process might be government speech. 2 This approach, as this Article
asserts, is the proper one. In the context of special public purpose
forums, the Article argues, the government speech paradigm should
apply, not the limited public forum test.
The second focus of this Article is what shall be referred to here
as the "sponsor acknowledgment" cases. Two appellate courts
recently have held that a government's promotion of its corporate
sponsors, by public acknowledgment of their contributions, is
government speech and does not create a limited public forum
entitling others to access. Especially where the acknowledgment
includes promotional information about the sponsors, it is hard to
distinguish between these cases and the many limited public forum
cases involving companies that pay the government to advertise on
government property. 14 The courts have not yet articulated any clear
distinction between governments' promotion of corporate sponsors
and governmental programs of displaying corporate advertisements.
The two types of cases result in different outcomes, however, despite
the apparent similarities: a revenue-raising purpose and lack of
declared expressive goals. 5
This Article asserts that the crucial distinction between the
sponsor acknowledgment cases and situations correctly labeled
limited public forums is the appearance of endorsement. Where an
affiliation resembles a partnership, so that the public will perceive
government approval of a sponsor's message, government should
122 S. Ct. 340 (2001) (directing the 9th Cir. to reconsider in light of Good News Club v.
Milford Cent. Sch., 533 U.S. 98 (2001)), remanded in 275 F.3d 1160 (9"' Cir. 2000)
(remanded to district court for further evidentiary hearings), No. CV-97-00327, slip op.
(D. Ariz. Nov. 10, 2003) (unpublished opinion granting summary judgment to plaintiff
based on new facts). Gentala is further discussed infra Part II.B.
12. Id.
13. See Wells v. City and County of Denver, 257 F.3d 1132 (10th Cir. 2001) (sign
acknowledging city sponsors on city's holiday display was government speech, triggering
no obligation to include others), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 997 (2001); KKK v. Curators of the
Univ. of Mo., 203 F.3d 1085 (8th Cir. 2000) (public radio station allowed to reject KKK as
sponsor), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 814 (2000). See infra Part II.B.
14. See infra Part I.B.1.
15. This theoretical gap is underscored by the "Adopt-a-Highway" cases, where states
have been required to permit the Klu Klux Klan to donate labor to a highway cleanup
program, and then to erect a state sign acknowledging this contribution. See, e.g., Cuffley
v. Mickes, 208 F.3d 702, 708-09 (8th Cir. 2000), cert. denied sub nom. Yarnell v. Cuffley,
523 U.S. 903 (2001). See infra Part III.C. In direct contrast, one of the sponsor cases
upheld rejection of the KKK as a public radio show contributor. See KKK, 203 F.3d at
1095.
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retain control over selection and the government speech analysis
should apply.16
These recent cases demonstrate the judicial confusion,
sometimes acknowledged explicitly, 7  over the considerable
intersection between limited public forums and government speech.
The scholarship in this area has been directed broadly at the theory of
government speech and at critiquing the Supreme Court's cases; 18
there has been no commentary at all on situations this Article refers
to as "special public purpose forum" and "sponsor acknowledgment"
cases. This Article focuses on applying existing Supreme Court
precedent to novel contexts and argues for an extension of the
government speech doctrine to encompass both trends. As shown by
the concluding examples, doing so will add to the speech market by
allowing government new venues to communicate broad policy
messages and by enhancing its ability to foster new public-private
expressive initiatives.
Part I gives necessary background on the limited public forum
test and shows its rigid restrictions on government's structuring of
new programs and relationships. Part II sets forth the Supreme Court
government speech cases and the recent appellate court applications.
Part III argues for expanding government speech, but also fashions a
principled approach to containing the impact: requiring government's
expression of values to adhere to publicly stated program goals. This
Part also explains why application of the Establishment Clause
endorsement test is a useful tool here for defining the types of
relationships where government may take values into account.
Finally, this Article illustrates its conclusions by analyzing the
expanding situations of light pole banners, city special events, and
16. Note that while organized here as two separate issues, there is substantial overlap
between special public purpose forum and sponsor acknowledgment analysis. See
discussion infra Part III.A.
17. See PETA v. Giuliani, 105 F. Supp. 2d 294, 297-98 (S.D.N.Y. 2000), affd, 2001
WL 1010004 (2d Cir. Sept. 5, 2001).
18. See MARK G. YUDOFF, WHEN GOVERNMENT SPEAKS: POLITICS, LAW
AND GOVERNMENT EXPRESSION IN AMERICA (1983); Randall P. Bezanson and
William G. Buss, The Many Faces of Government Speech, 86 IOWA L. REV. 1377 (2001);
David C. Cole, Beyond Unconstitutional Conditions: Changing Spheres of Neutrality in
Government Funded Speech, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 675 (1992); Abner S. Greene,
Government of the Good, 53 VAND. L. REV. 1 (Jan. 2000); Steven J. Heyman, State-
Supported Speech, 1999 Wis. L. REV. 1119; Robert C. Post, Subsidized Speech, 107 YALE
L.J. 151 (1996); Martin H. Redish & Daryl I. Kessler, Government Subsidies and Free
Expression, 80 MINN. L. REV. 543 (1996); Steven Shiffrin, Government Speech, 27 UCLA
L. REV. 556 (1980); Mark G. Yudoff, When Government Speaks: Toward a Theory of
Government Expression and the First Amendment, 57 TEX. L. REV. 863 (1979).
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government web sites.
I. THE DEVELOPMENT AND CONTOURS OF THE
LIMITED PUBLIC FORUM DOCTRINE
To demonstrate that limited public forum analysis is an
insufficient paradigm for special public purpose forums and sponsor
acknowledgments, it is first necessary to explain in some detail how
the limited public forum doctrine works. This Part will review its
foundations and the categories of content limitations seen in the case
law to show the surprising narrowness of the approach.
A. General Background
Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, which
originated the forum analysis approach, established the test for
government property that "is not by tradition or designation a forum
for public communication." 9 Under Perry and its progeny, "the State
may reserve the forum for its intended purposes, communicative or
otherwise, as long as the regulation on speech is reasonable and not
an effort to suppress expression merely because public officials
oppose the speaker's view."2 °
In Perry, the Court upheld a school district's grant of exclusive
access to a school mail system to the teachers' bargaining
representative, while denying such access to a rival union.2' This
distinction was deemed reasonable in light of the primary purpose of
the mail system, official school business, and viewpoint-neutral
because it was based on the relative status of the groups, not on their
positions on the issues. Also, the Court approved of drawing such
lines to keep inter-union squabbling from interfering with labor peace
in the schools.22
In the other foundation case is this area, Cornelius v. NAACP
Legal Defense Fund,23 the Court allowed the federal government to
limit participation in the annual federal employee charity drive to
direct service charities, while excluding legal defense and political
advocacy organizations. The Court held that the stated rationale of
19. 460 U.S. 37, 46 (1983). See Bezanson & Buss, supra note 18, at 1397-99, for a
more detailed history of the development of the forum approach.
20. Perry, 460 U.S. at 46.
21. Id. at 38-39.
22. Id. at 49, 52.
23. 473 U.S. 788 (1985).
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avoiding disruptive controversy was reasonable in light of the
revenue-raising purpose of the program."
Cornelius adopted the Perry test, but also provided further,
frequently cited factors for determining the type of forum created.
The Court stai 'd with the assumption that "[p]ermitting limited
discourse" does not create a public forum or trigger right to any
public access. Rather, the inquiry is whether the government has
"intentionally open[ed] a nontraditional forum for public discourse. 21
Government's stated intent, however, is not determinative. Instead,
courts are to look at the government's policy and practice, including
whether permission is required for access, as well as the nature of the
property and its compatibility with expressive activity.26
The last two factors give rise to an issue that is currently causing
great confusion in the courts: whether there is any difference between
a "nonpublic" forum, the term used in Perry and Cornelius, and a
"limited public forum.'"27 Some courts view the "limited public
forum" as a subset of the "designated public forum" and find that
strict scrutiny thus applies. They reason that there cannot be a
"nonpublic" forum if the venue is visible to the public and has
expressive activity as its purpose.28 This Article agrees with the courts
that conclude the "limited public forum" is a subset of the
"nonpublic" forum, but also asserts that there is no substantive
difference between the two schools of thought. The only meaningful
difference is between a nonpublic forum and a true designated forum,
one equivalent to a traditional public forum, where all content
24. Id. at 806-07.
25. Id. at 802-03.
26. Id.
27. See Summum v. Callaghan, 130 F.2d 906 (10th Cir. 1997) (identifying this issue
and concluding that limited public forum is a type of nonpublic forum). See also DeBoer
v. Vill. of Oak Park, 267 F.3d 558 (7th Cir. 2001) (declining to attempt to "reconcile this
confusion over the proper forum terminology" because not necessary to case where found
viewpoint discrimination); Hopper v. City of Pasco, 241 F.3d 1067 (9th Cir. 2001) (finding
that the limited public forum is a subset of the designated public forum, not a type of
nonpublic forum); PETA v. Giuliani, 105 F. Supp. 2d 294, 309 (S.D.N.Y. 2000), affd, 2001
WL 1010004 (2d Cir. Sept. 5, 2001) (reviewing the case law on this issue, noting: "[t]o say
that the ambiguities described have left this Court benumbed and bewildered is only
modestly overstated," and finding that considering limited public forums as a subset of the
nonpublic forum was the better view).
28. See, e.g., E. Timor Action Network, Inc. v. City of N.Y., 71 F. Supp. 2d 334, 344
(S.D.N.Y. 1999). But many cases apply the Perry/Cornelius reasonableness test to public
places. See infra Part I.B.1 (discussing transit advertising space). Many cases also apply it
to programs with expression as their purpose. See infra Part I.B.5 (discussing special
public purpose forums).
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distinctions are proscribed unless they pass strict scrutiny. In
contrast, even if a forum is considered "designated, but for a limited
purpose" (e.g., meeting rooms opened for school-related activities),
the government is still entitled to reject speakers who are outside
those content limits (i.e., make content-based decisions), just as in a
nonpublic forum.29
When courts apply the Perry/Cornelius reasonableness test, the
first question is always whether the government has sufficiently
limited access to the property.3" If so, they next evaluate: (i) the
acceptability of the content categories allowed and prohibited, and
29. Perry supports this. Although the school mail system was primarily for teacher-
administration communication, some outside organizations, such as the YMCA and Cub
Scouts, had been given access. See Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460
U.S. 37, 47 (1983). Nonetheless, because permission was required and not automatically
given, this type of "selective access" did "not transform government property into a public
forum." Id. at 48. Even if outside groups' access had created a "'limited' public forum,"
the Court did not apply heightened scrutiny to rejection of the outside union group,
because it was a different type of group.
Nor does Widmar, relied on by some courts to show a "designated" forum is
different from a "nonpublic" forum, undermine the point. Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S.
263, 269-70 (1981). Where a university's policy was to allow all student groups to use its
meeting room space, the Court found it had created a "forum generally open for use by
student groups," so that denial of meeting space to the plaintiff student group based on its
religious content was subject to strict scrutiny. Id. This is no different than the rule in a
nonpublic forum, where denying access to a speaker who is within the stated content
limitations would be deemed viewpoint discrimination, unconstitutional unless it met strict
scrutiny. See Summum, 130 F.2d at 917.
That the two categories of forum are indistinguishable is supported by a final
point: While no case expressly states it, it must be the case that any subject matter or
speaker limitations in a "designated" forum must be "reasonable" in the same manner as
would be required if the forum was deemed nonpublic. Although there is no judicial test
to point to, it cannot be the case that the limits drawn could be arbitrary, e.g., only tall
students, or viewpoint discriminatory, e.g., only students with no criticisms of the
administration.
30. Note that this Article, following the case law, speaks in terms of whether the
government has sufficiently limited the forum, which suggests that the government has the
burden of proof on this point. No cases expressly address the burden of proof issue, but it
seems apparent that plaintiff's burden is to show that he or she requested permission or
otherwise tried to speak in the forum at issue, and was denied or stopped, while other
persons - either those like him or indiscriminately - were allowed to speak. Then the
government must try to show a valid basis for doing this. It will never assert that it has
intentionally created a designated forum, open to all, but there was a compelling reason to
deny plaintiff's request to speak and denial was the narrowest grounds for accomplishing
that. Thus, at least in cases where a limited public forum is the best argument available,
the government always will respond with the claim that plaintiff was rejected because he
or she was outside the scope of the forum; that the content limitations on the forum were
reasonable and valid; and that it was not a matter of viewpoint discrimination, but rather
of neutral application of the forum limitations. This sequence is why the cases and this
Article read as if the government defendant had the burden of proof.
[Vol. 31:2
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(ii) whether denial of a particular request for access is in fact based on
dislike of the person or viewpoint expressed.3 While Perry and
Cornelius appear to give government substantial latitude to keep
controversy and divisiveness out of its limited forums, subsequent
decisions do not bear this out. 2 Instead, most attempted content
limitations are struck down as either inherently viewpoint
discriminatory or as allowing too much room for consideration of
viewpoint.
B. The Constitutionality of Various Types of Content Limitations
Governments have fashioned many types of content limitations
to serve their goals for the use of limited public forums, but most have
been ruled unconstitutional. As shown below, directly prohibiting
groups that discriminate, advocate, or incite violence has been struck
down as unconstitutional viewpoint discrimination, as has carving out
sectarian religious speech and screening for public controversy.
Analyzing these thwarted efforts proves the limited public forum
test's incompatibility with the special public purpose forum and
sponsorship selection. Its frequently asserted key principles - the
requirement of objectivity and the prohibition of value judgments -
are unworkable for public projects with broad expressive goals and
for partnership criteria. The only consistently successful method of
excluding controversial and divisive speech, the "commercial only"
policy,33 cannot serve that purpose outside the advertising forum
context, but it illustrates well the contours of the limited public
forum, as discussed below.
31. See infra Part I.B.
32. See infra cases collected in Part I.B.2 (impermissible to exclude topics of "public
controversy" from bus advertising on grounds of protecting riders' tranquility) and Part
I.B.4 (cannot allow one type of educational group, but exclude another based on the
likelihood it will be divisive).
33. Sometimes a policy is framed in terms of what is allowed and sometimes as what is
prohibited, i.e., "only commercial" or "no political," but courts review policy and practice
from both perspectives. Even where a holding is expressed in terms of one of the
categories, both the excluded and the included subjects are inherent in the analysis. No
court has looked at or defined what constitutes commercial in this context, but the safest
definition would include only advertisements proposing a commercial transaction. See
JOHN E. NOWAK, RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 16.26 (4th ed. 1991)
(stating that this is the clearest formulation of the category, but noting that definition is
not precise and the case law is complex).
Winter 20041
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1. Commercial Speech Only Policies.
Where there is a written policy for, and a consistent practice of,
limiting city bus advertising to commercial advertisements, courts
follow Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights," and the government
prevails." In Lehman, a fairly brief opinion decided before Perry, the
court found that based on twenty-six years of consistently enforced
limits, such advertising space was not a public forum. It held it was
acceptable for the City to reject all political ads "to minimize chances
of abuse, the appearance of favoritism, and the risk of imposing on a
captive audience," and rejected the political candidate's First
Amendment claim.36
As suggested by Lehman, consistency in practice is the single
most dispositive consideration of whether a policy is constitutional,
and the one essential reason "commercial only" policies survive is
that for the most part, they are simple enough to apply consistently.
Past practice is so heavily weighted in limited public forum claims
that even where there is no clearly established policy, a court will
evaluate the forum's history to determine whether the denial at issue
fits the pattern of what speech has been allowed in the past. 37  An
extremely consistent practice can even overcome a post-litigation
change in the written policy. 38
34. 418 U.S. 298 (1974).
35. See, e.g., Children of the Rosary v. City of Phoenix, 154 F.3d 972 (9th Cir. 1998)
(expressly relying on Lehman to uphold city bus advertisement policy banning all non-
commercial ads).
36. Id. at 305. Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc., 507 U.S. 410 (1993), where the
Court struck down a municipal ordinance allowing news racks for newspapers, but not for
commercial papers, does not undermine Lehman because it involved the public way,
where content-based distinctions are almost never permitted. Also, the rationale was a
lack of reasonable fit between the goals of the legislation (aesthetics and avoiding litter)
and the problems caused by the different types of speech, id. at 428, and arguably political
ads on public buses have different externalities than do commercial ones.
37. E.g., DiLoretto v. Downey Unified Sch. Dist., 196 F.3d 958, 969 (9th Cir. 1999).
The Ninth Circuit upheld a school's refusal to post a sign listing the Ten Commandments
in a baseball field advertising forum, even though its only policy was an ad hoc one to
exclude certain subjects as too controversial for the high school context. Because they had
never displayed anything but commercial business advertisements, the court inferred a
"commercial only" policy and found a nonpublic forum. The Ninth Circuit found the
"commercial only" policy reasonable, in light of the special nature of the school context,
for the purpose of avoiding the appearance of school sponsorship, making the students a
captive audience, and the costs of litigation, which would impinge on educational funds.
Id. at 968-69.
38. E.g., Children of the Rosary v. City of Phoenix, 154 F.3d 972 (9th Cir. 1998). The
city had a relatively amorphous policy of "no political or religious ads," pursuant to which
it rejected a Children of the Rosary (COR) advertisement containing a Bible quote and
[Vol. 31:2
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Where evaluation of a municipality's practice shows that it
actually enforces only a subset of its stated limitations, however, then
a court will find that the forum is limited only as to that narrower
category, but not as to the broader one.39  Finally, where a
municipality imposes no selective system of controls and has a history
of allowing a broad range of speech in its advertising forums, courts
will find a designated forum and apply strict scrutiny to invalidate all
rejections of proposed speech. '
the phrase, "Choose Life." Subsequently, the city changed the stated policy to "only
commercial ads," which more objectively excluded COR's initial advertisement. Because
even before the express commercial limitation, only 1% of its advertisements had any
other subject matter, the Ninth Circuit found a nonpublic forum. The new restriction then
was deemed reasonable in light of the city's interests in maintaining neutrality and
preventing a drop in advertising income. Id. at 976-77. But Compare id. with Matthew D.
McGill, Unleashing the Limited Public Forum: A Modest Revision to a Dysfunctional
Doctrine, 52 STAN. L. REV. 929, 942, 954 (2000), where the author asserts that government
can subvert the limited public forum doctrine by claiming that a challenged speech
restriction is a legitimate re-designation of the forum's content limitations, so that instead
of being characterized as a rejection of speech within the forum, which is subject to strict
scrutiny, a court would ask only whether the new content limitation was reasonable. I
disagree with the assertion that courts are so easily fooled. More likely, unless the new
policy was supported by actual past practice, as in Children of the Rosary, 154 F.3d at 976-
77, a court would apply strict scrutiny to any policy change brought on to deflect an
unwanted applicant.
39. For example, in Nat'l Abortion Rts. Fed'n. v. Metropolitan Atlanta Rapid Transit
Authority, 112 F. Supp. 2d 1320 (N.D. Ga. 2000), the transit authority's policy showed an
intent to open the bus advertising forum only to non-controversial commercial
advertisements, but in actual practice it had accepted advertisements on a wide variety of
public interest topics, including AIDs awareness and homosexual rights, and had
consistently rejected only expressly political advertisements. The court concluded that "at
best, MARTA has created a limited public forum which excludes only political speech," so
that its rejection of a pro-choice advertisement was subjected to, and failed, strict scrutiny.
Id. at 1326. See also E. Timor Action Network, Inc. v. City of N.Y., 71 F. Supp. 2d 334
(S.D.N.Y. 1999) (despite a stated policy of not allowing honorary street signs for political
purposes, after reviewing the actual practice of granting applications, the court concluded
that New York had successfully limited its forum only with respect to political parties and
candidates, so that all denials of other signs of a political nature were subject to strict
scrutiny).
40. E.g., Christ's Bride Ministries v. Southeastern Penn. Transp. Authority (SEPTA),
148 F.3d 242 (3d Cir. 1998) (where the advertising policy contained only one real
limitation, a ban on libelous or obscene ads, SEPTA retained sole discretion to reject any
advertisements, and SEPTA had accepted a broad range of advertisements, including
religious messages, advertisement criticizing political candidates, and even advertisements
on both sides of the abortion issue, the Third Circuit held that the transit authority had
created a designated public forum, so that its removal of an anti-abortion advertisement
from a bus violated the First Amendment); Planned Parenthood v. CTA, 767 F.2d 1225
(7th Cir. 1985) (where the CTA had maintained "no system of control" and accepted a
broad range of advertisements, the Seventh Circuit found it had created a public forum in
its bus advertising space, and so could not reject an abortion advertisement, which violated
its unproven, and probably unsustainable, policy of rejecting all controversial public issue
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Although it is the most objective content limitation, even
commercial advertising has blurry boundaries that strain the ideal of
consistent application. For example, social interest groups may try to
squeeze into a "commercial ads only" forum by selling some related
product. In one case, a pro-life group and the ACLU amended their
messages by tacking onto their ads the phrase "buy a bumper sticker"
and their telephone numbers, but the court rejected the transparent
attempt to convert a social interest advertisement into a commercial
one." Nor does limiting a forum to commercial ads necessarily keep
out all political statements, as illustrated by a case that involved a bus
advertisement featuring New York Magazine's logo and the
statement: "Possibly the only good thing in New York Rudy hasn't
taken credit for.
4 2
While these courts were willing and able to draw the line
between "commercial" and "political" ostensibly based on the
predominant purpose of the advertisement at issue, the issue becomes
more complex where the commercial and the political involve the
same subject matter. In one case, an airline pilots' union sought to
place its message in an airport advertising display that had included
airline advertisements. The Seventh Circuit concluded that the policy
was not viewpoint-neutral just because all political ads had been
rejected.43 Presumably, the argument would be that "American
Airlines mistreats its employees" presents a different viewpoint on
the company than does an advertisement's implied message of
"American Airlines is a wonderful company." While this is not the
general consensus," it does show the fragility of the reliance on
ads).
41. Children of the Rosary, 154 F.3d at 981.
42. N.Y. Magazine v. Metro. Transp. Authority, 136 F.3d 123 (2d Cir. 1998) (court
deemed ad commercial despite its political commentary). See also E. Timor Action
Network, Inc. v. City of N.Y., 71 F. Supp. 2d 334, 339 n.2 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) (involving a
prohibition on commercial advertising in honorary street signs, the court noted that the
line between culture and commerce is blurred and found that signs for "People Magazine
Way" and even "Beauty and the Beast Way" during new Broadway production
undermined restriction).
43. Air Line Pilots Ass'n (ALPA) v. City of Chi., 45 F.3d 1144, 1160 (7th Cir. 1995)
(involving the City's rejection of ALPA's advertisement supporting pilots in a union-
management dispute, for posting in one of the diorama display cases at O'Hare Airport,
pursuant to its written policy prohibiting any political advertisements; remanded to
determine whether the Airport had succeeded in keeping the forum nonpublic, and
suggesting that if the City had accepted airline advertising, it might have to accept airline
unions' protests).
44. E.g., Children Of the Rosary, 154 F.3d at 981 (noting that allowing ad for health
clinic that offers abortions, pursuant to a commercial only policy, while rejecting pro-life
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content categories. Using the "same subject" test would gut the
limited public forum test, making illusory the ability to fashion
content limitations because drawing lines based on topic offers no
hope of consistent administration.
While a "commercial ads only" policy does block most speech
against public policy, it is an open question whether governments can
further exclude a subset of such speech, typically alcohol and tobacco
ads, where promoting such products contravenes the administration's
values." Such a prohibition is a reasonable content limitation, at least
where it can be argued that stimulating demand for alcohol and
tobacco use undermines the forum's revenue-raising purpose."
Where a government spends tax dollars on public health campaigns to
reduce consumption and mitigate the associated negative effects,
including alcohol-related crime, opening its property to promote the
products has a contradictory fiscal impact. Nonetheless, a policy
excepting certain kinds of advertisements is a risky strategy for
governments because they will likely be subjected to claims of
viewpoint discrimination.
and pro-choice message advertisements, would not violate the First Amendment). Even
in Perry, the Court held that there was a discernible and valid content distinction between
matters of school business, including outside activities for students, and union politics.
Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 48 (1983).
Moreover, the Seventh Circuit in Air Line Pilots Ass'n, cited as its support AIDS
Action Committee of Massachusetts v. MBTA, 42 F.3d 1, 11 (1st Cir. 1994), which made a
different point. The First Circuit did find viewpoint discrimination where a transit
authority rejected a condom awareness advertisement for sexual overtones, although it
had displayed movie advertisements with more sexually explicit graphics. Id. There,
however, the content limitation itself was a prohibition on sexually explicit materials, so
that the case involved only a content limitation inconsistently applied.
45. While some limited public forum cases have referenced such policies, for example,
DiLoretto v. Downey Unified High Sch. Dist., 196 F.3d 958 (9th Cir. 1999) (past practice
of rejecting alcohol and tavern ads from display in baseball field advertising forum) and
N.Y. Magazine, 136 F.3d 123 (city bus ad policy prohibited ads promoting tobacco), in no
case have they been at issue. Nor would the analysis be governed by the cases invalidating
restrictions on such advertisements on private property. See, e.g., Lorillard Tobacco Co. v.
Reilly, 533 U.S. 525 (2001) (prohibition on all outside advertising of smokeless tobacco
and cigars within 1000 feet of schools and parks); 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. R.I., 517 U.S. 484
(1996) (statute prohibiting alcohol price advertisements).
46. E.g. Cornelius v. NAACP, 473 U.S. 788 (1985) (allowing exclusion of subset of
charities, advocacy organizations, which the government had determined might decrease
donations by sowing dissension).
47. If a prohibition on alcohol or tobacco advertising in a limited public forum was
deemed viewpoint discrimination, it would be subject to the strictest scrutiny available for
restrictions on commercial advertising. The Central Hudson test provides that commercial
speech is protected if it is not false or misleading and that any regulation must directly
advance a substantial governmental interest and not be more extensive than necessary to
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2. "No public controversy" Policies.
Every court to consider the issue has struck down government
attempts to limit forum content by a "no public controversy" policy.
As shown in the "commercial only" section above, to retain limits on
a forum requires proof of a consistent practice of permitting only
speech that is within the stated content limitations. Because the very
nature of "public controversy" is amorphous, made up of the shifting
vagaries of public opinion, it lacks the capacity for predictable,
uniform enforcement.
In addition, because limited public forums require selective
control over access, which generally translates into requiring prior
permission to speak, courts also sometimes speak in terms of an
unconstitutional prior restraint. To regulate private speech in a
traditional or designated public forum requires "narrow, objective
and definite" standards to ensure that decisions are not based on
content. 8 While perhaps not strictly applicable where content-based
decisions are allowed, this rationale is used, without analysis; here it
performs a similar function of screening out potential viewpoint
discrimination.49
Nor is there any drafting tool by which a government can salvage
its policy from an inherently subjective standard. As an example,
serve that interest. See N.Y. Magazine, 136 F.3d at 128 (citing Central Hudson Gas &
Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 564 (1980)).
48. Forsyth County, Ga. v. Nationalist Movement, 505 U.S. 123 (1992) (evaluating
parade ordinance).
49. See N. Y Magazine, 136 F.3d at 131 (court found bus advertising space a
designated forum, then reviewed rejection of advertisement as a prior restraint, bearing
the presumption of unconstitutionality); Hopper v. City of Pasco, 241 F.3d 1067, 1080 (9th
Cir. 2001) (court found city hall art gallery a designated forum, then struck down
restriction on "no controversial art" based on unconstitutionality of "'censorship by public
opinion."') (quoting Texas v. Johnson, 49 U.S. 397 (1989) (striking down flag-burning
ban)); E. Timor Action Network, Inc. v. City of N.Y., 71 F. Supp. 2d 334, 348 (S.D.N.Y.
1999) (holding city's alleged policy of rejecting any honorary street signs that would
generate political controversy an unconstitutional prior restraint, without regard to
whether a designated public forum was created).
For similar reasons, courts always will find unconstitutional a policy that provides
no standards at all, and so gives administrators completely unfettered discretion. See
Amandola v. Town of Babylon, 251 F.3d 339 (2d Cir. 2001) (where written policy for use
of town hall meeting rooms contained no limitations on content, it was an unconstitutional
prior restraint; problems inherent in such unfettered discretion apparent from
commissioner's viewpoint discriminatory decision to allow religious services unless they
included proselytizing); Int'l Union of Operating Eng'rs, Local 150 v. Orland Park, 139 F.
Supp. 2d 950 (N.D. I11. 2001) (striking down sign ordinance because of its exemption for
"banners on light poles," which stated that banners must be made available to the Village
Board for approval, without giving any standards at all).
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Atlanta's transit authority set forth careful written standards that
attempted to preemptively define exactly the kind of "public
controversy" it would exclude from its bus advertisement forum."'
The standards excluded matters that are "widely reported" and
"arouse strong feelings," and were held unconstitutionally vague and
overbroad." Given that result, it is difficult to imagine a successful
definition. Furthermore, that a municipality can show evenhanded
application of a "no public controversy" standard, by rejecting speech
on both sides of a controversial topic such as abortion, does not
change the outcome. 2
3. Excluding Speakers Who Advocate or Incite Discrimination or
Violence.
Probably the biggest concern of governments in starting a project
that includes speech is that they will be forced to give access to groups
who advocate or incite discrimination, hate, violence, or other notions
antithetical to the common good. Use restrictions on groups who
discriminate or may incite violence, however, consistently have been
struck down on the basis of viewpoint discrimination as well as other
constitutional norms.
While discrimination against protected groups is against
government policy and the law,53 excluding groups that discriminate
from a limited public forum is not allowed. A recent case involved a
school board's termination of the Boy Scouts' use of school meeting
rooms, based on the board's dislike of the Scouts' intolerance of
homosexuality. 4 The court held that first, the action was based on
50. See Nat'l Abortion Rts. Fed'n v. Metro. Atlanta Rapid Transit Auth., 112 F. Supp.
2d 1320 (N.D. Ga. 2000). Atlanta's transit authority's advertising policy provided, in
relevant part:
No advertising that supports or opposes any position in regard to a matter of
public controversy shall be displayed in the Authority's stations, vehicles or other
facilities. For this purpose, a matter is considered to be one of public controversy
if it is widely reported by the newspapers, television or radio stations, or other
news media in the area served by the Authority, and it reasonably appears from
such reports that the subject matter arouses strong feelings in a substantial
number of people.
Id. at 1324. The court found the policy overbroad because it would bar ads for sports
teams, such as the Atlanta Braves, which evoke strong feelings, and vague because terms
such as "widely reported" and "reasonably appears" were deemed to put too much
discretion in the hands of government officials. Id. at 1327.
51. Id. at 1324.
52. See id. at 1323.
53. See, e.g., 1964 Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1971, 1975 (a)-(d), 2000(a) et seq.
54. Boy Scouts v. Till, 136 F. Supp. 2d 1295 (S.D. Fla. 2001).
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viewpoint, and not a reasonable content restriction, and second, that
the action violated the Boy Scouts' expressive freedom of
association.5 Similarly, in Cuffley v. Mickes, the Eighth Circuit
rejected Missouri's attempt to exclude the Ku Klux Klan (the
"KKK") from participation in the Adopt-a-Highway Program based
on a purported policy of prohibiting discriminatory groups.56 Under
the program, groups that agreed to keep a stretch of highway free of
litter would receive public acknowledgment of their participation by a
sign posted on that spot. That court held that to require the KKK to
alter its message of racial superiority and segregation as a condition
of participation would violate its freedom of political association. 7
Cuffley and the other Adopt-a-Highway cases also involved the
second category that governments have tried to use to keep hate
groups from limited public forums - a prohibition on speakers who
incite violence. In rejecting this limitation, courts look to general
55. Id. at 1308 (citing Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640 (2000)). Although the
school had argued that because the Scouts draw members and leaders primarily from the
student body and faculty, the school has "a compelling interest in stopping discrimination
against those with whom it has a special relationship and duty," the court found that since
the decision concerned access to a limited public forum by outside groups during non-
school hours, the special deference accorded to the educational function and the school
context did not apply. Id. at 1310.
56. Cuffley v. Mickes, 208 F.3d 702 (8th Cir. 2000), cert. denied sub nom. 534 U.S. 903
(2001). See also Texas v. KKK, 58 F.3d 1075 (5th Cir. 1995); KKK v. Ark. State Highway
Dep't., 807 F. Supp. 1427 (D. Ark. 1992).
While none of these cases explicitly goes through the process of forum analysis, all
apply the reasonableness/viewpoint neutral test, which assumes a limited public forum.
Presumably, for safety reasons the shoulder of a highway is not a public forum, and the
signs were limited as to category of speaker (only those participating by regularly picking
up litter) and as to content (only the name of the organization was allowed).
Only the Eighth Circuit case Cuffley involved written regulations stating the
content limitations, that no groups which discriminated or incited violence could
participate, and those regulations were adopted after receipt of the KKK application and
had been applied only to them. The other states gave only ad hoc reasons for the denials.
Thus, the only pre-existing, established limitation was that a group had to agree to clean
up a section of highway (and, presumably, carry through with that agreement). Because
the KKK had requested to participate in a limited public forum and fell within the only
general, established restriction, strict scrutiny should have applied. See Texas v. KKK, 58
F.3d at 1082 (concurring opinion) (asserting that strict scrutiny was warranted, but that it
was satisfied there under the facts). Nonetheless, the cases are helpful in the limited
public forum context because they applied the reasonableness/viewpoint neutral test,
despite not actually establishing the nature of the forum.
57. Cuffley, 208 F.3d at 708.
58. The relationship between the two issues has been noted by scholars who argue
that racist speech constitutes a sublimated or muted form of violence against its targets.
See, e.g., Charles Lawrence, If He Hollers Let Him Go: Regulating Racist Speech on
Campus, DUKE L.J. 431 (1990); Mari Matsuda, Public Response to Racist Speech:
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First Amendment jurisprudence: government cannot prohibit speech
based on a fear of protests and violence that reflects a generalized
"hecklers' veto," but only where there is an imminent threat of
violence. 9 While the cases do not analyze whether these principles
for protecting freedom of speech on the public way should be applied
wholesale to government programs, such content limitations violate
the limited public forum doctrine as well. First, where the state seeks
to prevent angry crowd demonstrations and counter-protests,
arguably it is acting to suppress a viewpoint that it predicts many
citizens will dislike. Second, if government tries to ban groups that
engage in or advocate violence, that standard would be found vague
or subjective, at least if they attempt to do so without specific criteria
or concrete evidence.'
In the only case permitting fear of violence as a reason for
excluding the KKK, the rationale was site-specific and backed by
evidence. In Texas v. KKK, the Ku Klux Klan had applied to adopt a
stretch of highway outside a public housing project that had been
desegregated by a federal court order.6  Because the KKK had
opposed the desegregation order so violently that a state court had
enjoined them from blocking access to the area, the Fifth Circuit held
rejection of the KKK was viewpoint neutral in that it was based on
Considering the Victim's Story, 87 MICH. L.REv. 2320 (1989).
59. Ark. State Highway Dep't., 807 F. Supp. at 1437 (citing Collin v. Smith, 578 F.2d
197 (7th Cir. 1978) (village officials could not prohibit the Nazis from marching in Skokie)
(quoting Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 4 (1949) (freedom of speech is nevertheless
protected against censorship unless shown likely to produce "a clear and present danger"
of violence)). Note that this leaves open the possibility of content limitations excluding
speech that can be characterized as inciting imminent lawlessness or proposing an illegal
transaction, which is helpful because discrimination and hate crimes are against the law in
many municipalities. For example, the Chicago Transit Authority's advertising policy
states:
3. Commercial advertising that proposes transactions which would constitute
unlawful discrimination... is not permitted ....
6. Advertising that is directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action
and is likely to incite or produce such action, including but not limited to
unlawful action based on a person's or persons' race, color, sex, age, religion,
disability, national origin, ancestry, sexual orientation, marital or parental status,
military discharge status, or source of income, is not permitted.
Chicago, Ill., Ordinance 91-169 (Sept. 11, 1991). [copy on file with HASTINGS
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY].
60. See Cuffley, 208 F.3d at 709 (holding regulation prohibiting groups engaged in
violent or criminal behavior pretextual and invalid because it had never been applied to
any other group and its reach was ill-defined).
61. 58 F.3d 1075, 1079 (5th Cir. 1995).
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the foreseeable impact of a continuation of the group's documented
past conduct.62
A related category, depictions of graphic violence and sex, is one
type of offensive and degrading speech that government may have
some ability to exclude from limited public forums. Several cases
suggest that it would be acceptable to bar such content if the material
were described quite specifically so that the policy could be applied
neutrally.6' Of course, some could argue that offensiveness is
inextricable from what is simply an individual's expression of a
viewpoint otherwise permitted in the forum. Nonetheless, the
comfort of captive audiences, combined with the inescapable visuals
and the low value of such speech, probably accounts for courts'
suggestions that such content limits could pass muster.
Finally, municipalities sometimes have used more subtle drafting
tools as a proxy for keeping out discrimination and violence, or at
62. Id. at 1081. The court further held that the state's denial was a reasonable effort
to protect the residents from intimidation, comply with the desegregation order, insure
free use of the highway, and protect residential privacy against the imposition of an
unwanted message. But see id. (concurrence) (finding viewpoint discrimination that
survived strict scrutiny because compelling reasons). Cf Nat'l Abortion Rts. Fed'n v.
Metro. Atlanta Rapid Transit Auth. (MARTA), 112 F. Supp. 2d 1320, 1327 (N.D. Ga.
2000) (where MARTA rejected a pro-choice advertisement and asserted an interest in
protecting its employees and passengers from potential violence, which could rise to the
level of a compelling interest, but NAR showed that the advertisements had run in other
cities without incident and MARTA presented no evidence that Atlanta would be
different, the action in a designated forum failed strict scrutiny).
63. See Hopper v. City of Pasco, 241 F.3d 1067, 1080 (9th Cir. 2001) (where the court
suggested that a city art gallery could reject overtly sexual art if it did so pursuant to
objective standards carefully describing the types of art that would be rejected as violating
community standards of decency); AIDS Action Comm. of Mass., Inc. v. Mass. Bay
Transit Auth., 42 F.3d 1, 13 (1st Cir. 1994) (recognizing that MBTA could prohibit certain
types of explicitly sexual advertising if it did so by precise standard, applied neutrally). See
also Leslie Jacobs, The Public Sensibilities Forum, 95 Nw. U. L. REV. 1357 (2001) (arguing
for validity of such content limitations).
A good example of a very specific and concrete policy explaining what types of
advertising are prohibited on city buses can be found in the Chicago Transit Authority's
policy, which prohibits, in relevant part:
Advertising that is legally obscene is not permitted. In addition, sexually
explicit advertising depicting nudity (male or female genitals, pubic areas, or
buttocks with less than a fully opaque covering; female breasts with less than a
fully opaque covering or any part of the areolae or nipples; or the covered
genitals in a discernibly turgid or otherwise recognizable state) or sexual
intercourse or other sexual acts is not permitted.
Advertising that portrays graphic violence, such as through depiction of
human or animal bodies, body parts, or fetuses in state of mutilation,
dismemberments, disfigurement or decomposition, is not permitted.
Chicago, Ill., Ordinance 91-169 (Sept. 11, 1991). [copy on file with HASTINGS
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY].
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least divisiveness. This approach, however, is unlikely to work. In a
recent case involving a use policy for village hall meeting rooms that
restricted the content to civic matters, the Seventh Circuit held
unconstitutional a requirement that a proposed event not be based on
or promote the ideas or beliefs of any particular group.6' For the
village to say that a group may only discuss a civic topic if it "allows
all points of view to be expressed, even those antithetical to its
position on that topic," is viewpoint discrimination, the court held,
because it effectively precludes the expression of individual
viewpoints.65  In addition, the court struck down a companion
requirement limiting use to civic activities that "benefits the public as
a whole" on the grounds that it was overbroad because it gave village
officials unfettered discretion. 66
4. Religion - Always Viewpoint Discrimination.
Recent developments in how religion is dealt with in the limited
public forum have obliterated religion as a viable subject matter
content limitation, and rendered imperceptible the line between
content and viewpoint. While earlier cases had held unconstitutional
the exclusion of religious speech from limited public forums, none
had involved core religious practices. For example, in Rosenberger v.
Rector & Visitors of University of Virginia,67 a university had funded
student newspapers, but denied funding to one that published news
from an evangelical perspective. Similarly, in Lamb's Chapel v.
Center Moriches Union Free School District," a school district had
denied use of its meeting rooms for a showing of a Christian-based
film on parenting, a topic otherwise allowed. 69
In Good News Club v. Milford Central School," the Court held
that a school district must allow after-school use of its classrooms to a
group that gives school children religious instruction, including Bible
64. DeBoer v. Vill. of Oak Park, 267 F.3d 558, 574 (7th Cir. 2001).
65. Id. at 571-72. A group otherwise eligible to use the Village Hall for its civic event
"cannot be directed by governmental authorities to format their presentation in a way that
the government finds suitable." Id. at 572.
66. Id. at 573.
67. 515 U.S. 819, 828 (1995).
68. 508 U.S. 384, 387-89 (1993).
69. For a recent application, see Daily v. N.Y. City Hous. Auth., 221 F. Supp. 2d 390,
402-03 (E.D.N.Y. 2002) (denial of resident's request to use public housing community
center for post-9/11 grief counseling/Bible Study, when other similar, secular uses allowed,
held unconstitutional viewpoint discrimination).
70. 533 U.S. 98 (2001).
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stories, hymns and invitations to accept Jesus Christ.71  What
distinguishes Good News from these earlier cases is that the Club's
activities went beyond speech on an acceptable forum topic, but from
a religious perspective, and into the realm of religious instruction and
worship practices. Traditionally, the dividing line between approved
neutrality and Establishment Clause violations has been whether the
public assets shared with a religiously-affiliated organization have
been used for a secular purpose, or for those core religious activities.72
So, courts and government have significant experience in
administering this kind of content limitation. The Supreme Court,
however, characterized the Good News Club class as teaching moral
development from a religious perspective and held that the Club's
rejection was unconstitutional viewpoint discrimination.73
The far-reaching implications of Good News are illustrated by a
recent Seventh Circuit opinion, DeBoer v. Village of Oak Park ,7
which held that a village could not exclude a National Day of Prayer
service from a meeting room dedicated to civic uses, even though the
service was not limited to prayer for government leaders, but had
included numerous New Testament readings, Christian hymns, and
prayers for the Christian church - all the elements of a Sunday
morning church service."
The Seventh Circuit stated that after Good News, not only must
government allow discussion about civic matters from a religious
71. Id. at 103.
72. See Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793, 840 (2000) (O'Connor, J., concurring)
(although public assets that convey significant financial benefit - there, the loan of
computers and other equipment - now may be given to parochial schools, they still may
not be diverted to religious instruction). Compare id. with Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536
U.S. 639, 658 (2002) (upholding school voucher program although tuition subsidies used
towards entirety of parochial education, based on distinction between permissible indirect
aid, which is a product of individual choice, and unconstitutional direct financial aid to
parochial schools).
73. Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 533 U.S. 98, 111 (2001). See also
Culbertson v. Oakridge Sch. Dist., 258 F.3d 1061, 1064 (9th Cir. 2001) (following Good
News, school district objecting to a "Good News Club" using its meeting rooms tried to
distinguish its situation by asserting that the children involved were younger and the
program began closer to the end of the regular school day, but court found unpersuasive
given the Supreme Court's holding that the relevant audience for endorsement
considerations is the reasonable adult, not the impressionable child; the court did draw the
line, however, at teachers' distribution of permission slips during class, which was held
unconstitutional endorsement).
74. 267 F.3d 558 (7th Cir. 2001).
75. See DeBoer v. Vill. Of Oak Park, 86 F. Supp. 2d 804, 811 (N.D. Il1. 1999), where
the district court reviewed the evidence of the actual content of the National Prayer Day
event, and reversed his earlier holding requiring access, rev'g 53 F. Supp. 2d 982.
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perspective, but it must also permit "worship and prayer directed
toward the betterment of government and the enlightenment of civic
leaders" because they "are methods of expressing a religious
viewpoint about civic subject matter."76 All that remained was the
Village's "civic purposes" content restriction; it still could deny
permission to use the rooms to conduct regular worship services
unrelated to a specific civic purpose." The rejection of religion as a
permissible content limitation in this context casts doubt on all
attempts at broad content categories. 78
5. Forums Created for Civic, Cultural and Aesthetic Purposes.
The content limitations explored to this point have arisen in
either the revenue-raising advertisements or the meeting room
allocation context, where the purposes of the forums are relatively
straightforward. Generally, the focus in these contexts is on keeping
out certain types of subject matter, those thought controversial,
rather than on what to include.
Where governments open forums for civic, cultural, or aesthetic
purposes, however, they have broad, expressive goals. These
contexts, which this Article has termed "special public purpose
76. DeBoer, 267 F.3d at 569. "By restricting the plaintiffs from using the means of
expression that best reflects their views on how to address civic problems or best provides
the reasons (albeit grounded in Christianity and the Bible) as to why they believe their
viewpoint to be persuasive, the Village is requiring a 'sterility of speech' from the plaintiffs
that it does not demand of other groups with regard to this requirement." Id. (quoting
phrase from Good News, 533 U.S. at 123 (Scalia, J., concurring)). In addition, the court
found the distinction between "speech from a religious viewpoint" and "religious prayer,
instruction and worship" beyond its competence to administer without undue
entanglement. DeBoer, 267 F.3d at 570.
77. Id. at 570 n.11. This Article expresses no opinion on the advisability or
constitutionality under the Establishment Clause of allowing religious worship and
instruction in public buildings, but merely raises the concern that requiring such access
under the limited public forum doctrine renders the line between content and viewpoint
imperceptible.
Note that where a forum is limited to "commercial ads only," rejection of purely
religious speech still would be allowed, as it would not relate to the forum topic. See
DiLoreto v. Downey Unified Sch. Dist., 196 F.3d 958, 969 (9th Cir. 1999) (decided prior to
Good News, where there was a consistent practice limiting ballfield ads to solely
commercial ones, it was not viewpoint discrimination to reject a proposed ad listing the
Ten Commandments, which did not advertise or even mention a business). An
advertisement for the sale of religious goods or services, e.g. a religious bookstore, would
be within the forum topics and could not be excluded for Establishment Clause reasons.
78. See supra, Part I. Conclusion, for discussion of application of Good News to
restrictions on political speech.
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forums, ' 79 are inherently more complex. The courts nonetheless have
evaluated such government programs by applying the limited public
forum test. Discussing recent cases will show how the special public
purpose forum is incompatible with the limited public forum test's
requirements of objectivity and viewpoint neutrality.
Broad policy goals that do not specify a subject matter or
speaker category will always be open to charges of viewpoint
discrimination. An interesting example is a case involving internet
links on a city web page, The Putnam Pit, Inc. v. City of Cookeville.80
The website's stated purpose was to provide information about city
services, attractions and officials, and the city's policy, arrived at only
in response to plaintiff's request to post a link, was that eligible web
sites must "promote the city's tourism, industry, and economic
welfare."'" In its original opinion, the Sixth Circuit characterized the
web page as a nonpublic forum and opined that such a policy gave too
much discretion to city officials. It then remanded the case for a trial
on whether the city had discriminated against plaintiff based on his
viewpoint.82
Just recently, the Sixth Circuit issued a new opinion, The Putnam
Pit v. City of Cookeville ("Putnam II"),s3 upholding a jury verdict for
the city on the grounds that because the plaintiff's website was critical
of the city's government and often described the city in a negative
light, it was outside the scope of the forum's promotional focus, and
thus there was no need to address the issue of viewpoint
discrimination. 84 While this Article agrees with the result - allowing
the government the discretion to select private speech that supports
its expressive projects' goals - stretching the limited public forum test
is too tenuous a means. Being for or against a town's administration
is essentially a viewpoint; at a minimum, allowing such positions to
serve as a forum's content limitation is too confusing for courts to
administer consistently. Moreover, that approach is outside the scope
of Perry and Cornelius, where the Court relied on the objective, non-
79. See supra, Introduction.
80. 221 F.3d 834 (6th Cir. 2000) ("Putnam I").
81. Id. at 845.
82. Id. at 846.
83. 2003 WL 22000304, at *6 (6th Cir. Aug. 20, 2003) ("Putnam IF').
84. Id. The plaintiff started his website to promote his views of government
corruption in Cookeville, including a cover-up of an unsolved murder. In response to the
city's new website policy, he added a page on "Commerce and Tourism." Id. at *5. He
asserted that his website promoted commerce and tourism in the long run by promoting
good government; the court focused on his heavy use of satire and ridicule. Id. at *5-6.
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ideological definition of forum speaker limits.85 As shown in Part II,
the government speech doctrine is more appropriate for expressive
contexts; explicit recognition of this is essential to having predictable
constitutional guidelines.
Even where a city attempts an elaborate enumeration of subject
matter categories, where the content is amorphous, the application
will always be subject to charges of viewpoint discrimination. This is
illustrated by East Timor Action Network v. City of New York, a case
that involved New York's written policy for the temporary renaming
of streets.86  The city allowed honorary signs to promote or
commemorate any of the following: a public event of a not-for-profit
nature, a cultural event, an event or person of historical significance,
an individual who has made a significant contribution to New
Yorkers, and a community or public service. The policy also
prohibited a street renaming to promote products, commercial
entities, and political parties or candidates, and the city claimed that
in practice, its policy also excluded all political signs.87 Even with such
detailed categories, however, a city would need to exercise discretion
to accomplish its purposes; whether someone has made a "significant
contribution" to New York, for example, requires a judgment call.
There, the court had no occasion to analyze the acceptability or
meaning of the listed categories, however, because the plaintiff's signs
were within the written policy criteria and the facts contradicted the
city's claim that its actual practice was to exclude all types of political
signs. 88
85. See Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 49 (1983)
(finding exclusion of rival union from school mail system viewpoint neutral because it was
based on the group's non-elected status, not its positions on the issues); Cornelius v.
NAACP Legal Defense Fund, 473 U.S. 788, 806 (1985) (approving as viewpoint neutral
the bright-line division between direct service charities and advocacy organizations for
purposes of inclusion in federal employees charity drive).
86. 71 F. Supp. 2d 334 (S.D.N.Y. 1999). See also Int'l Union of Operating Eng'rs,
Local 150 v. Orland Park, 139 F. Supp. 2d 950 (N.D. Ill. 2001) (court struck down sign
ordinance because of its exemption for "banners on light poles," which stated that banners
must be made available to the Village Board for approval, without giving any standards at
all).
87. E. Timor Action Network, Inc. v. City of N.Y., 71 F. Supp. 2d 334, 338-39
(S.D.N.Y. 1999).
88. Id. at 339-40. In E. Timor, the city had refused to post temporary street signs
stating "East Timor Way" and "1991 Santa Cruz Massacre" outside the Indonesia
consulate in connection with the anniversary of East Timor's annexation, even though on
numerous occasions street signs naming a person or event calculated to make a political
statement had been placed outside an offending country's embassy (e.g., "Tiananmen
Square Corner" outside the Chinese Consulate). Less politically popular, similar requests
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Finally, in PETA v. Giuliani, a district court upheld rejection of
an applicant for a public-private art project based on a broad,
subjective standard.' It did so, however, professing to apply the
limited public forum test, yet explicitly relying on government speech
concepts, without exploring the inherent tension between the two.
The case has limits as a model because the decision was based on the
city's good faith and the unique facts presented - other PETA
submissions had been accepted - but its discussion is illustrative.
PETA had submitted two cow designs to participate in
"CowParade New York City 2000," a public art event that was a joint
venture between the city and various private entities, and one was
rejected. The cows were to be displayed on both public and private
property and the city expected financial benefits in the form of
increased tourism revenue and 10% of the revenue from sale of
CowParade merchandise. Selection of the art was done by a design
selection committee comprised of both government and private
persons.9° The committee rejected one of PETA's proposals on the
grounds that three of the statements on a cow marked with lines
portraying butchers' meat cuts were too graphic and violent for a
public art display."
Although the court found this was a limited public forum, based
on the selective nature of the application process, the selection
criteria specifically upheld by the court were broad, expressive, and
necessarily discretionary. The written guidelines prohibited selection
of any designs that were indecent, contrary to public morality,
religious, political or sexual in nature, or that contained corporate
logos or advertisements. In addition, the city and CowParade
organizers stated that in order to achieve their "expressive, economic,
civic and aesthetic purposes," they looked at whether the proposed
design would fit in with an exhibit intended to be "festive, decorous,
whimsical, and appropriate for a broad-based audience of all ages."9
had been rejected in earlier cases as well (e.g., "Yasser Arafat Way" outside the Israeli
Consulate). In light of both the written policy and the actual practice, the court held that
the only content limitation on political subject matter was a ban on ads for political parties
and candidates.
89. 105 F. Supp. 2d 294, 295 (S.D.N.Y. 2000).
90. Id. at 299-300.
91. Id. at 301. The objectionable lines involved confrontational statements conveying
that cows are still conscious when skinned, castrated and dehorned, and that eating meat
causes impotence.
92. Id. at 320. The district court in PETA refrained the criteria somewhat and
expressly upheld as reasonable in this context the "exclusion of political, sexual or
religious subjects and terms purposely evocative of controversy," and restriction of design
[Vol. 31:2
The court held that when serving as a patron of culture and the
arts or promoting aesthetic or civic values, "the government requires
a reasonable zone for exercise of discretion and flexibility which is
not always capable of being articulated as precise and universal
standards." 93  The content limitations at issue were necessary to
protect the exhibit from degenerating into "a massive public billboard
which would display, along with much worthy art and creativity, a
multitude of political axes and grinding stones, obscenities and self-
advertising." This would, in turn, decrease expected revenues and
impose on captive audiences, who would be forced to encounter a
particular exhibit near their homes or place of work on a daily basis
for three months.94
In reviewing the acceptability of the stated criteria, the court
focused on the overall approach, rather than examining each of the
words; for example, it chose not to examine what would be the
contours of a ban on "political" subjects. Instead, the court reviewed
the Committee's attempt to be inclusive, including the fact that it had
accepted PETA's other design proposal, which arguably also might be
considered offensive, and had objected to only three of the twelve
panels, which it had suggested PETA modify. 95 Such facts suggested a
good faith effort to adhere to the art project's goals, rather than an
attempt to suppress a controversial viewpoint.96
approval to "festive, decorous and celebratory art." Id. at 329-30.
93. Id. at 322. The court looked to the standards of Nat'l. Endowment for the Arts v.
Finlay, 524 U.S. 569 (1998) (upholding discretionary standards, which incorporated a
decency factor, in awarding NEA grants), as a "somewhat analogous" example, but
reviewed the PETA facts solely as a limited public forum, and not as government speech.
94. Id. at 330. Cf Hopper v. City of Pasco, 241 F.3d 1067 (9th Cir. 2001) (striking
down a restriction on "controversial art" in a public art gallery in city hall, and criticizing
post-hoc distinctions made by the city hall curator between "abstracted" and "sexualized"
depictions of nudity; while the court opined that community standards of decency could be
incorporated into written objective criteria, it did not counsel how this might be done).
95. Id. at 326.
96. Compare a more recent case, PETA v. Gittens, 215 F. Supp. 2d 120 (D. D.C.
2002). It does little to add to the analysis, except to underscore that courts are labeling
public art projects as limited public forums and further, that whatever the standards, when
there is blatantly inconsistent application, they will be found unconstitutional. Gittens
involved the Party Animals, another city sidewalk art display. The materials distributed to
potential artists and sponsors said they were seeking "creative and whimsical" animals,
and would not "allow direct advertising of any product, service, a company name or social
disrespect," and that there were "restrictions against slogans or inappropriate images." Id.
at 123. The suit involved rejection of PETA's entry of a "sad circus elephant," with the
words "'The Circus is Coming." See: Shackles Bullhooks Loneliness All Under the "Big
Top,"' and accompanying illustrations. Id. at 131. The court found this a violation of the
First Amendment based on "a pattern of inconsistency in its treatment of similar
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This focus on good faith is consistent in all three cases, Putnam
Pit, East Timor, and PETA. In each case, the court concentrated on
whether the decision at issue showed some animus toward the
plaintiff, rather than on the contours of acceptable content limitations
in an expressive purpose forum. This does not seem to correspond
with the very broad understanding of viewpoint discrimination put
forward in Good News. The Supreme Court did not ask whether the
school district had acted out of dislike for the Club, or whether it had
discriminated between different religions in applying its "educational
purpose" criterion. Presumably, the municipality in Putnam would
assert the discretion to decide whether linking to church websites
promotes tourism, and New York City would like to decide whether a
cow dressed as Cardinal Egan meets its "festive" criterion. Rejecting
either of these forms of speech, however, could be seen as viewpoint
discrimination against religion under Good News. This demonstrates
that the absence of bad faith does not work well as the sole
touchstone. Thus, these cases do not provide much structure for
future decisions.
None of these courts even considered whether the context at
issue could be considered government speech; rather, they analyzed
whether the government had created a limited or a designated public
forum. Only one court, the Ninth Circuit in Gentala v. City of
Tucson, has analyzed which construct best fits a public-private
venture. In Gentala, the court was presented with a "Civic Events
Fund" created by the City to help develop new public events. The
case illustrates that certain partnerships are best regarded as
government speech.' This Article will discuss in Part II the
government speech concept and how far it may be stretched.98
C. Conclusions on Limited Public Forums
What may be done in a limited public forum to satisfy
government's purposes while complying with the First Amendment?
The only consistently upheld means to avoid bringing debate over
noncompliant entrants that is inherently unreasonable." Id. Accepted entries included
ones showing the World Trade Center, the Pentagon, and a list of September 11 victims,
and one showing civil rights activists, which the court found "cannot credibly be regarded
as 'festive' or 'whimsical,' or calculated to foster an atmosphere of 'amusement,'
'enjoyment,' or 'FUN."' Id. at 132. This court did not undertake any complex analysis, did
not even distinguish between content limitations and viewpoint discrimination, but merely
applied the "reasonableness test" of Rosenberger and Good News. Id. at 131.
97. See supra Part ll.B.
98. See Infra, Part II.
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divisive political and social issues into a government program is a
"commercial ads only" limit in a revenue-raising forum. Even that
category distinction is not sacrosanct; as the Seventh Circuit
cautioned, Lehman did not determine the reasonableness of a
political ads restriction "for all time. ' 9 The limited public forum test
requires courts to ask whether content limitations are reasonable in
light of the purpose of the forum. Given that the reasonableness of
prohibiting political ads in Lehman depended in part on protecting
the "captive audience" of public bus passengers, arguably the result
could differ in a forum where the audience is not captive."
Moreover, even if a "no political speech" content limitation was
theoretically reasonable in a given forum, after Good News it is
difficult to predict when "political" would be considered content
rather than viewpoint."' For example, with regard to meeting rooms
open for broad purposes such as "educational," but closed to
"political" speech, government might be required to include the
Young Republicans, as well as The World Church of the Creator, a
white supremacist organization, on the grounds that they are
engaging in educational purposes from a political perspectiveY 2
While prohibiting the political as opposed to commercial
advertisements is a comparatively bright line, applications become
murkier as forum purposes expand.
Particularly when one enters the realm of the "special public
purpose forum," "political" looks more like viewpoint and less like
content. Consider an honorary street sign policy similar to that
described for New York City in East Timor, where the city claimed
that it had limited the forum's purpose to the historical and the
cultural, while prohibiting the political. It is uncertain whether such
99. Air Line Pilots Ass'n v. City of Chi., 45 F.3d 1144, 1159 (7th Cir. 1995).
100. Air Line Pilots Ass'n involved an airport advertising display, which the court did
not attempt to distinguish from the bus ad context, but arguably airport patrons walking
through a busy terminal are a relatively less captive audience.
101. Whether "political" remains a content category, rather than a viewpoint, became
an issue following Rosenberger. Compare Marjorie Heins, Viewpoint Discrimination, 24
HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 99, 105-10 (1996) (asserting that after Rosenberger, restrictions on
political speech are unconstitutional viewpoint discrimination), with Wojciech Sadurski,
Does the Subject Matter? Viewpoint Neutrality and Freedom of Speech, 15 CARDOZO
ARTS & ENT. L.J. 315, 320-27 (1997) (arguing that restrictions on political speech should
not be treated as viewpoint discrimination).
102. See, e.g., Jay Hughes, World Church Membership Up, Creator Matt Hale Says,
DAYTON DAILY NEWS, July 3, 2000 (reporting on group's status two years after member's
shooting spree, quoting Hale as stating that the group's mission is to "spread the word"
about white racial loyalty).
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parameters would be held reasonable or enforceable. Compare, for
example, a sign commemorating New York's founding date with a
sign proclaiming the date the city was stolen from Native Americans.
One represents history in the traditional mainstream version, while
the other is arguably more political in nature, but it too is history
from a different perspective. The nature of the "political" is quickly
revealed as more a philosophical question than an easily administered
content category.'03 Moreover, the Putnam II approach of allowing
viewpoint discrimination to masquerade as a content limitation is not
a solution with universal appeal."m
If broad content categories are so easily classified as
unconstitutional viewpoint discrimination, then the only alternative
for limiting forums to serve their intended purposes, outside the
"commercial only" advertisement forum, would be narrower content
limitations. Courts have suggested that excluding the identifiable
subcategory of political candidates' and political parties'
advertisements is defensible, even where other public service and
social interest speech is permitted.'5 Other acceptable subject matter
descriptions might include: allowing speech on only local issues and
excluding international relations; allowing city-subsidized not-for-
profits to market their events and excluding promotions of other
events; and allowing speech advertising only for artistic and cultural
events with large, established audiences.
These are just a few examples, but they have in common that the
subject matter descriptions are concrete and clear, which makes them
relatively easy to administer consistently, and perhaps look more like
subject matters than do broader categories, such as "political."
Despite efforts to be narrow, however, one can imagine charges that
even some of these content limitations are viewpoint discriminatory,
by excluding the international perspective on local issues, for
example, or preferring mainstream over independent art. As
discussed above, even an effort to exclude a subset of commercial
advertising, alcohol and tobacco ads, may be attacked as viewpoint
103. See also two more recent cases where courts held that ordinances prohibiting
political, religious and social advocacy messages on light poles are inherently viewpoint
discriminatory and therefore unconstitutional: Cimarron Alliance Found. v. Oklahoma
City, 290 F. Supp. 2d 1252 (W.D. Okla. 2002) and Heartbeat of Ottawa County v. City of
Port Clinton, 207 F. Supp. 2d 699 (N.D. Ohio 2002).
104. See discussion supra Part I.B.5.
105. Nat'l Abortion Fed'n v. Metro. Atl. Rapid Transit Auth., 112 F. Supp. 2d 1320,
1326 (N.D. Ga. 2000); E. Timor Action Network v. City of N.Y., 71 F. Supp. 2d 334, 346
(S.D. N.Y. 1999).
[Vol. 31:2
Winter 2004] EXTENSIONS OF GOVERNMENT SPEECH 99
discrimination."' More significantly, if governments' sole alternative
for maintaining a valid limited public forum is to adhere to only very
narrow subject matter categories to escape claims of viewpoint
discrimination, there will be a certain poverty of expression in
government projects that are construed as limited public forums.'07
If government is unable to construct content limitations sufficient
to avoid having its property used to send discriminatory, partisan or
otherwise inflammatory messages, as a last resort it retains the right
to close down the forum and stop all outside speech on that
property.' This alternative was approved by the Supreme Court in
Members of the City Council of the City of Los Angeles v. Vincent,
which upheld the city's ordinance prohibiting all signs on public
property, including street light poles, and it has been relied on in a
number of limited public forum cases.' °9 The specter of this loss to the
106. See discussion supra Part I.B.1.
107. See, e.g., Bezanson & Buss, supra note 18, at 1458-59 (asserting that under current
limited public forum law, government unquestionably could avoid controversy by
choosing to fund only certain mainstream categories of art, such as symphonies or the
ballet, and that this argues for allowing more discretion so as to allow a broader range of
artistic subsidies).
108. Note that one last idea for circumventing the problems of the limited public
forum, delegating to a private organization the job of establishing forum limitations or
controlling the selection process, also is unsuccessful, as least so long as government
retains some control or ability to give input. See Hopper v. City of Pasco, 241 F.3d 1067
(9th Cir. 2001) (where city commissioned private arts council to administer pilot program
for art gallery in city hall, delegating soliciting and pre-screening art, court still held city
violated First Amendment where rejection based on city official's finding work offensive);
Nat'l Abortion Fed'n v. MARTA, 112 F. Supp. 2d 1320 (N.D. Ga. 2000) (where transit
authority sold advertising through two companies, and bus shelters also owned by one of
them, but it retained "at least some control" over ad selection, summary judgment granted
against MARTA).
If a municipality further distanced itself by retaining no role in administration of
the forum and no ability to affect its policies - an unlikely scenario - the First Amendment
would apply only upon a finding of state action. See Lebron v. Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp.,
513 U.S. 374 (1995) (citing Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715 (1961))
(while majority held that Amtrak was a government entity, dissent found it a private entity
and thus analyzed whether its rejection of a billboard advertisement could be attributed to
the government, finding the relationship between Amtrak and the federal government
insufficiently symbiotic).
109. 466 U.S. 789 (1984). See DiLoretto v. Downey Unified Sch. Dist., 196 F.3d 958,
970 (9th Cir. 1999) (holding that closing a baseball field ad forum to avoid controversy of
displaying Ten Commandments ad was acceptable because "[t]he government has an
inherent right to control its property, which includes the right to close a previously open
forum."). See also Rhames v. City of Biddeford, 204 F. Supp. 2d 45 (D. Me. 2002)
(allowed city to temporarily shut down public access channel for neutral reason, despite
individual councilmen's complaints about plaintiff's broadcasts; while stating that there
might be some circumstances where a temporary closing of a forum could be
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speech market supports giving government some discretion to define
the parameters of acceptable speech on its property, whether using
limited public forum rhetoric or, as seen below, that of government
speech. " °
II. THE GOVERNMENT SPEECH DOCTRINE
In contrast to government's severely curtailed options for
achieving a broad expressive purpose in a limited public forum,
"when the State is the speaker," it enjoys broad latitude in selecting
content. " 1 Where private speech can be characterized as expressing a
governmental message, then viewpoint neutrality is not required.
This Part first sets forth the Supreme Court's decisions, which
primarily have involved government funding decisions, then reviews
the few, recent appellate court cases, which apply the government
speech concept to various sponsorship contexts.
A. Supreme Court Cases
The foundation case for the government speech doctrine is Rust
v. Sullivan."' The Court in Rust upheld a statutory provision that
limited federal funding for family planning services to programs that
did not advise on abortion. In so holding, the Court rejected a claim
that doing so violated the First Amendment because it discriminated
against the pro-choice viewpoint. Without clearly discussing the
unconstitutional viewpoint discrimination); Id. at 51 n.5 (collecting law review articles
saying closing forum allowable); Cuffley v. Mickes, 208 F.3d 702 (8th Cir. 2000) (while
generally finding unconstitutional state's reasons for denying KKK's application to
participate in Adopt-a-Highway Program, court allowed denial as to highways within the
city limits of St. Louis based on a neutral moratorium on the adoption of highways there);
Grossbaum v. Indianapolis-Marion County Bldg. Auth., 100 F.3d 1287, 1290 (7th Cir.
1996) (holding that closing a forum to all displays to avoid displaying a religious symbol
was not unconstitutional). But see Missouri Knights of the Klu Klux Klan v. Kansas City,
723 F. Supp. 1347 (W.D. Mo. 1989) (allegation that city shut down local public access
channel to prevent KKK from using it stated first amendment claim).
110. Note that most recent articles on limited public forums argue for more restrictions
on governments' ability to fashion content-based parameters. See McGill, supra note 38;
Nicole B. Casarez, Public Forums, Selective Subsidies & Shifting Standards of Viewpoint
Discrimination, 64 ALB. L. REV. 501 (2000) (no viewpoint distinctions in government
subsidy forums); Steven G. Gey, Reopening the Public Forum - From Sidewalks to
Cyberspace, 58 OHIO ST. L.J. 1535 (1998) (no content limitations in nonpublic forums
unless excluded speech would significantly interfere with government's noncommunicative
activities there). Cf Jacobs, supra note 63 (advocating restrictions of graphic sex and
violence where captive audiences).
111. Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 833 (1995).
112. 500 U.S. 173 (1991).
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concept of government as speaker, the Court held that "'government
may make a value judgment favoring childbirth over abortion, and...
implement that judgment by the allocation of public funds."'
' 3
While the Rust decision emphasized that the government was
simply funding one activity to the exclusion of another,"' later cases
have characterized the decision as "recogniz[ing] that when the
government appropriates public funds to promote a particular policy
of its own, it is entitled to say what it wishes."" 5 In particular, Rust
established that when government uses private speakers to transmit
its own message - there, a pro-life message delivered by doctors and
nurses providing government-funded family planning services - the
involvement of private speakers does not change the context from
government speech to that of a forum for private speech.
By contrast, in Rosenberger, the Court held that the government
speech doctrine did not apply to the University's student activities
appropriations because, rather than promoting its own favored
message, the University was "expend[ing] funds to encourage a
diversity of views from private speakers.""16 What made it clear to the
Court that the University was funding private speech, and thus
required to be viewpoint neutral, was the administration's own
express disclaimers. The University's agreement with each student
group receiving funds specified that such organizations were not
subject to its control and were not its responsibility, and that funding
did not indicate University approval; these disclaimers also were
required to be included in any dealings with third parties.
117
113. Id. at 192-93 (citation omitted).
114. Id. at 192.
115. Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 833 (citing Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 194 (1991)).
See also Legal Servs. Corp. v. Velazquez, 531 U.S. 533, 541 (2001) (stating that, although
not expressly part of the rationale of Rust, the case shows that "viewpoint-based funding
decisions can be sustained... [where] the government is itself the speaker.")
116. 515 U.S. at 834. The Court noted that this was not controlled by the school-
specific cases, citing to Hazelwood Sch. District v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260 (1988)
(protecting school administrators' right to exert pedagogical discretion by controlling
students' speech).
117. Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 823-24. See also Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Wis. Sys.
v. Southworth, 529 U.S. 217 (2000) (holding that public university's collection of a
mandatory student activities fee used to fund extracurricular student speech did not
violate objecting students' free speech rights, provided that allocation of funds was
viewpoint neutral; Court also stated that funding program was not government speech
because: the university was not using its own funds to advance a particular message;
administration officials had no control over the speech's content; and the sole purpose of
collecting the fee was to facilitate the exchange of ideas among its students); Legal Servs.
Corp. v. Velazquez, 531 U.S. 533 (2001) (holding that restriction on the use of Legal
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The other two major cases involved a different type of
government speech. National Endowment for the Arts v. Finley,"8 and
Arkansas Educational Television Commission v. Forbes"9 both
involved discretionary "speech selection" judgments by government
entities, rather than governmental transmission of a particular
substantive policy via private speakers. First, Forbes involved a state-
owned public television broadcaster which was sued by a political
candidate excluded from a televised candidate debate. The Court
found that such debates are a very narrow exception to the public
broadcaster's generally substantial editorial discretion, and held that
rejection based on a candidate's objective lack of support was a
reasonable limitation in a nonpublic forum."2
The opinion's significance, however, was its statement that
"[wihen a public broadcaster exercises editorial discretion in the
selection and presentation of its programming, it engages in speech
activity.' '21  In other words, the speech selection process is itself
government speech. That a necessary component of programming
decisions is to compile the speech of third parties does not give those
persons a right of access to broadcast programs. Viewpoint neutrality
could not be accomplished easily, if at all, in this context. It would
require repeated intrusion by the courts to determine whether
particular viewpoints had received sufficient coverage, with the
inevitable result an undesirable infringement on journalistic
discretion.122
NEA v. Finlay, without explicitly identifying a government
speech activity, also found that viewpoint neutrality was not required
in a type of government selection of private speech - there, the
decision of which art exhibits to fund.' The case involved the
validity of a statutory amendment passed in response to public furor
over NEA funding of two exhibits: a display of homoerotic
Services Corporation funds, which subsidize legal services to indigents, that prohibited
funding any organizations challenging the welfare laws, was governed by Rosenberger, not
Rust, because the LSC program was designed to facilitate private speech in that lawyers
are required to speak on behalf of their clients, a necessarily independent role, while only
government attorneys should be paid to defend the welfare statutory scheme).
118. 524 U.S. 569 (1998).
119. 523 U.S. 666 (1998).
120. The candidate debate was made an exception because it is both an intentional
forum for political speech and so essential to democracy. Id. at 675.
121. Id. at 674.
122. Id. at 674-76.
123. 524 U.S. 585-86.
[Vol. 31:2
EXTENSIONS OF GOVERNMENT SPEECH
photographs by Robert Maplethorpe and Andres Serrano's work,
Piss Christ. The section provided that the NEA Chairman shall enact
regulations and procedures to ensure that "artistic excellence and
artistic merit," were the criteria used to judge applications, "taking
into considerations general standards of decency and respect for the
diverse beliefs and values of the American public.
1 24
Justice O'Connor, writing for the Court, distinguished this
context from Rosenberger on the grounds that in arts funding, the
government is making esthetic judgments on artistic excellence, which
is "inherently content-based."'25  Without expressly stating so, the
Court appeared to hold that since the government already was
engaged in a subjective process of art selection, the additional
directive to consider other subjective factors - indecency and
compatibility with American values - did not make the criteria
unconstitutional. In addition, the Court found that the subjective
decision-making standards were not unconstitutionally vague because
of government's role as patron of the arts. This role did not lend
itself to the objective standards that would be required in a criminal
statute or regulatory scheme. In essence, under Finlay, where a
funding program establishes some necessarily discretionary standard,
such as "excellence," the government is taking content into account in
every funding decision, and doing so does not violate a constitutional
requirement of viewpoint neutrality.
The nature of the outside limits to this position, if any, was left
unclear. The majority opinion warned against turning such subsidies
into a "penalty on disfavored viewpoints," such as by manipulating
them to have a "coercive effect,"'26 but it is hard to reconcile these
statements with the facts surrounding the addition of an indecency
criteria. Justice Scalia's explanation of what would constitute such a
"coercive effect," while more clear, is quite narrow. In his view, the
only situation where a government subsidy could constitute an
"abridgment" of speech, violating the First Amendment, is where the
subsidy is the sole source of grant money, so that the threat of
rejection would have the effect of suppressing applicants' speech
124. Id. at 576 n.* (citing 20 U.S.C. § 954(d) (2000)). The NEA Chairman stated that
they had implemented the statutory provision by requiring diversity on the selection
committee. Justice O'Connor found it unnecessary to determine whether this
interpretation was reasonable, finding the significant point to be that there was no
absolute prohibition on indecency, it was merely a consideration. 524 U.S. at 580-81.
125. Id. at 586.
126. Id. at 587.
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altogether.'27
The Court's rationale for the government speech doctrine is that:
"'[W]hen the government speaks, for example to promote its own
policies or advance a particular idea, it.is, in the end, accountable to
the electorate and the political process for its advocacy. If the
citizenry objects, newly elected officials later could espouse some
different or contrary position.' ' 12' This rationale is most persuasive
where a clear policy message is at issue, as in the Rust anti-abortion
policy, and somewhat weaker where the government speech involves
speech selection judgments. Patterns of decision-making, including
written selection criteria, may be corrected by the political process,
but few individual decisions would stir the voters. In the speech
selection cases, however, the Court's rationale appears to be more
utilitarian. It is based on the notion that there is no practical way of
reducing the decision process to clearly articulated, objective
standards, so that distinctions based on content and viewpoint are
endemic to the contexts. Arguably, the First Amendment interests in
fostering more and diverse speech are better served by allowing
administration of discretionary standards, unimpeded by court
attempts to enforce a ban against viewpoint discrimination on a case-
by-case basis.
B. Recent Appellate Court Cases
The last few years have seen a handful of appellate court cases
grappling for the first time with the government speech doctrine.
These cases fall into two broad categories. The two cases that
specifically found government speech and relied on that doctrine to
deny claims of access both involved government talking about its
private sponsors, in ways that acknowledged the relationship and
directly or indirectly advertised the sponsors. 129  Two other cases
127. Id. at 596 (Scalia, J., concurring). Note that Justice Souter, in the sole dissent,
found arts funding analogous to Rosenberger because, when acting as a patron,
government is acting to promote and foster diverse private speech, and thus is required to
be viewpoint neutral. Id. at 611-13. He deemed this a new category, as opposed to the
role of government-as-speaker, which he appeared to define as only where government
has a substantive message to transmit. id. at 613. Compare Heyman, supra note 18
(rejecting Justice Scalia's view that government funding does not implicate First
Amendment and Justice Souter's position that funding decisions should be subject to the
same First Amendment restrictions as regulation of private speech; asserting a middle
ground balancing public and private interests, based on theories of distributive justice).
128. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Wis. Sys. v. Southworth, 529 U.S. 217, 235 (2000),
quoted in Legal Servs. Corp. v. Velazquez, 531 U.S. at 533, 541-42 (2001).
129. Wells v. City and County of Denver, 257 F.3d 1132 (10th Cir. 2001); Knights of
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involved the flip side of sponsorship: government subsidizing and
promoting private events for some public purpose. There the
question is whether government has its own substantive message or
instead has opened a forum for diverse private expression."3
The second group of cases also illustrates the conflicted
interaction of government speech with the Establishment Clause.
Where private religious speech is involved, because government is
prohibited from promoting or disfavoring a religious message, the
"government speech" label has a different impact. Rather than giving
government enhanced ability to state its own position without regard
to viewpoint neutrality, the Establishment Clause imposes a stricter
requirement of government neutrality than does the limited public
forum doctrine."'
While it arose in the somewhat specialized context of public
broadcasting, Knights of the Ku Klux Klan v. Curators of the
University of Missouri,'32 is significant because it establishes the ability
of government to choose which sponsors it will accept to underwrite
government functions and, correspondingly, when it can reject those
the KKK v. Curators of the Univ. of Mo., 203 F.3d 1085 (8th Cir. 2000).
130. See Gentala v. City of Tucson, 244 F.3d 1065 (9th Cir. 2001) (en banc), vacated by
534 U.S. 946 (2001) (directing the Ninth Circuit to reconsider Good News Club v. Milford
Cent. Sch., 533 U.S. 98 (2001)), remanded to 275 F.3d 1160 (9th Cir. 2000) (remanded to
district court for further evidentiary hearings), No CV-97-00327 (D.Ariz. Nov. 10, 2003
(unpublished opinion granting summary judgment to plaintiff based on new facts);
Linnemeir v. Bd. of Trs. of Purdue Univ., 260 F.3d 757 (7th Cir. 2001).
Relatively few cases even discuss government speech. See, e.g., Livestock Mktg. Assoc. v.
U.S. Dep't. of Agric., 335 F.3d 711 (8th Cir. 2003) (holding compelled financial support of
government beef promotion not within government speech doctrine); Downs v. L.A.
Unified Sch. Dist., 228 F.3d 1003 (9th Cir. 2000) (court found government speech where
high school teachers, with approval of the principle, had created a bulletin board for
materials related to Gay and Lesbian Awareness Month, proclaimed by the school board
to promote tolerance, which included school district posters and other materials; thus,
school was not required to allow Downs, a teacher, to post his own competing bulletin
board, which advocated his view of the immorality of homosexuality); Henderson v.
Stalder, 112 F. Supp. 2d 589 (E.D. La. 2000) (where state asserted its right to take a
position promoting certain kinds of social behavior by creating its own "choose life"
license plate and a "choose life" fund in the state treasury, court held that, while it could
promote its message through legislation and fund appropriation, the creation of more than
sixty "specialty" license plates honoring various groups created a limited public forum,
which required viewpoint neutrality); Lash v. City of Union, 104 F. Supp. 2d 866 (S.D.
Ohio 2000) (where plaintiffs claimed city officials violated First Amendment by using tax
funds to promote the city's viewpoint on two election issues, court suggested this was
permissible as government speech).
131. See infra Conclusion, for further discussion of application of Article assertions to
religious speech.
132. 203 F.3d 1085 (8th Cir. 2000).
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sponsors that have messages contrary to its principles. The case
involved a radio station owned by a state university, which had
rejected a KKK request to underwrite the "All Things Considered"
program.133  Federal law requires that public radio stations
acknowledge their sponsors and allows a neutral description of the
sponsors' product or service, along with identifying slogans and
location."' While the station's general manager did not routinely
evaluate the policies of the thirty or so underwriters per week, she
had rejected other groups in the past."5 The University Chancellor
ultimately rejected the KKK's request, citing as anticipated negative
consequences: jeopardizing future gifts from African-American
donors, decreasing student enrollment, and undermining the
Chancellor's efforts to create equality in the community for African-
Americans. 136
The Eighth Circuit found that the radio station's
acknowledgment of sponsors was government speech by the
university and upheld the university's right to refuse to announce a
financial association with the Missouri KKK."7 The court also noted
that even if the government speech doctrine espoused in Forbes was
limited to matters of journalistic discretion, the decision not to
publish "a financial association with the Missouri KKK" was
sufficiently editorial to fall within the public broadcasting exception
to forum analysis."3 Even if the radio station was not legally required
to acknowledge its underwriters, the Eighth Circuit held, it still
should have the right to reject such an association, finding "no
support in the case law for the proposition that, where descriptive
information about the donor is conveyed to the public, a donor has a
First Amendment right to have its cash contribution accepted by the
donee."'39  So, although it involved public broadcasting, the case
strongly supports government's right to refuse to accept sponsorships
from groups with which it disagrees.
133. Id. at 1089.
134. Id. at 1088-89.
135. Id. at 1089 (noting rejection of underwriting requests from "Ultimate Fighting
Championships," a political group called "The American Friends Service Committee,"
and a "house of ill repute").
136. Id. at 1090.
137. Id. at 1093-94.
138. See id. at 1094-95 & n.11 (relying on Ark. Educ. Television Comm'n v. Forbes,
523 U.S. 666 (1998) and Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc. v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S.
94 (1973)).
139. Id. at 1094.
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Similarly, Wells v. City and County of Denver140 held that
government's acknowledgment of its sponsors was government
speech. The City and County of Denver's holiday display, located on
the steps of the City and County Building, included a creche and
numerous secular Christmas symbols and a large sign, which stated:
"Happy Holidays from the Keep the Lights Foundation and the
sponsors that help maintain the lights at the City and County
Building," and listed six corporate sponsors. 141 Plaintiffs requested
permission to place within the display their own sign, which
proclaimed "this season of Winter Solstice," and also made some
arguably offensive, anti-religious statements, including "the Christ
Child is a Religious Myth," and stated it was "presented by the
Freedom From Religion Foundation. ' 12 After receiving no response,
they put up the sign, which the City then removed."'
The government asserted that the display was Denver's holiday
message to the community, so that it could determine the content.
Plaintiffs argued that the plain language of the sign showed it was a
message from, and not to, the corporate sponsors. Since private
speech had been allowed in the display, they argued that they were
entitled to include their own message. The court held that the
holiday display, including the Happy Holidays sign, was government
140. 257 F.3d 1132 (10th Cir. 2001).
141. Id. at 1137.
142. Id. at 1137. The full text of the sign read:
At this season of
THE WINTER SOLSTICE
may reason prevail.
There are no gods,
no devils, no angels,
no heaven or hell.
There is only
our natural world.
THE "CHRIST CHILD" IS A RELIGIOUS MYTH.
THE CITY OF DENVER SHOULD NOT
PROMOTE RELIGION.
"I believe in an America
where the separation of church and state
is absolute."
John F. Kennedy -1960 Presidential campaign.
PRESENTED BY THE FREEDOM FROM
RELIGION FOUNDATION
143. Id. at 1137-38.
HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY
speech because the city had built, paid for, erected and provided
security for the sign, and there was no evidence that the corporate
sponsors even knew about it.'" Since the display was Denver's own
message, as opposed to any kind of forum, the city was not required
to incorporate the messages of any private parties. Under Wells,
then, display of sponsors' names does not alone transform a given
context into one where other private speakers must be welcomed'4.
The other two recent government speech cases involved the
opposite situation: where government subsidizes private expressive
projects. In Gentala v. City of Tucson, the city had established a
"Civic Events Fund," pursuant to which it provided city-owned stage
lighting and other special event services using tax funds and city
employees, to certain not-for-profit groups through an application
process. '4 The city's policy stated that its purpose was to
affirmatively support civic events that:
[C]elebrate and commemorate the historical, cultural and
ethnic heritage of the City and the nation, or increase the
community's knowledge and understanding of critical issues...
[;] generate broad community appeal and participation[;] instill
civic pride in the City, state, or nation[;] contribute to tourism[;]
or are identified as unique community events.47
144. Id. at 1140, 1142.
145. Note that for a court to analyze a government's holiday display on its property as
government speech is not new, but the context has been different. The Supreme Court
cases in this area have addressed whether the message conveyed by a given display
violated, or would violate, the Establishment Clause, not stand alone freedom of speech
claims by an excluded speaker. The litmus test has been whether a reasonable observer
would view the display as the whole, including the message at issue, as the government
speaking and endorsing religion. See, e.g., County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 533
(1989). Note that these cases do not use the term "government speech." While the
concept is pre-existing, the phrase is being used more frequently.
In Wells v. City of Denver, the court did not address the issue of endorsement,
presumably because the display itself celebrated the secular holiday, including Santa and
the elves, and that is all the reasonable observer would see; he or she would not be
deemed privy to a behind-the-scene rejection of the symbols of competing holidays. The
dissent, however, made a compelling argument that given Denver's exclusion from its
holiday display of plaintiffs' pagan message, and an earlier rejection of a menorah, Denver
had acted to advance the Christian religion in violation of the Establishment Clause. 257
F. 3d at 1132, 1157 (10th Cir. 2001). The remainder of the majority opinion focused on
whether plaintiffs had any other First Amendment right to put up their own unattended
display and held that the content-neutral policy against any unattended displays on city
hall steps was a valid time/place/manner restriction that did not violate the Establishment
Clause. Id. at 1147-50.
146. Gentala v. City of Tucson, 244 F.3d 1065, 1068-70 (9th Cir. 2001).
147. Id. at 1068.
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Among the requirements for organizations receiving Fund
support were that they coordinate planning the event with the city's
Civic Events Coordinator, and promise to publicize the city's
contribution of services in their event advertising.
When the city rejected plaintiffs' application for a National Day
of Prayer event because of the event's religious nature, plaintiffs
claimed viewpoint discrimination under Rosenberger.148  The city
argued that the government speech paradigm applied, so that the city
had discretion to implement its qualitative selection criteria to
promote its program's goals, citing Finley, Forbes, and Rust. The
Ninth Circuit decided on Establishment Clause grounds that the city
could not fund such a religious event, but its dicta suggested the new
application of government speech which this Article puts forth.9
Unlike in Rosenberger, the court noted, the city is not acting to
encourage the interchange of ideas:
[T]he City is concerned with providing for its citizens and
tourists events of certain kinds that the City believes enhance
Tucson's ambiance as an attractive place to live and visit.
Because that is the goal, the City affirmatively identifies itself as
the sponsor of funded events, placing its imprimatur on the
events in a manner somewhat like the editor of an anthology
does, while the university in Rosenberger did quite the
opposite.15
148. Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819 (1995). See
discussion supra Part I.B.4.
149. 244 F.3d at 1073.
150. Id. at 1073. As noted above, see supra note 130, after the Supreme Court
remanded to the Ninth Circuit for reconsideration of its holding, which was based on the
Establishment Clause, in light of Good News, the Ninth Circuit remanded the case to the
district court for further evidentiary hearings on the city's actual practices, including the
degree of selectivity present. Based on an April 13, 2004 telephone conference with the
attorney for the city of Tucson, the case developed as follows. Further discovery produced
a letter from the city to Fund grantees stating that they should not claim the city as a
partner or sponsor, but only as a contributor, and also pointed out the city's annual
sponsorship of a Native American Easter pageant. Given that the Ninth Circuit's opinion
that the Fund was more like government speech was based on the city's affirmatively
identifying itself as a sponsor, these new facts made a holding of government speech
unlikely. On November 10, 2003, the district court issued an unpublished decision for the
plaintiff on the summary judgment motions that were argued March 3, 2003, but instructed
the parties in a written order dated November 24, 2003, that the opinion has no
precedential value. See Gentala v. City of Tucson, No. CV-97-00327 (D. Ariz. Nov. 24,
2003) (order). Thus, the court's conclusion, particularly based on these new facts, does not
undercut the Ninth Circuit's earlier dicta.
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The main factor that supported finding a limited public forum,
the court found, was that most applicants received the funding, so the
degree of selectivity present in Forbes and Finley was lacking.' To
show government speech, a municipality must show that it has
actively screened each potential private speaker and allowed only
those which the administrators conclude further program goals.
152
The Ninth Circuit's recognition that only the government speech
approach permits government discretionary selection, while the
limited public forum test precludes it, is a more accurate read of
Supreme Court jurisprudence than decisions like PETA or Putnam II,
which conflate the two doctrines.
Compare Gentala to Linnemeir v. Board of Trustees of Purdue
University,"3 a second recent case, where a government provided a
venue and other assets and had some role in producing events.
There, a state university allowed a theater student to produce in the
university theater a performance of the play Corpus Christi, which
depicts Jesus Christ as a homosexual who has sexual relations with his
disciples. The dissent argued that the production was government
speech, and thus an unconstitutional endorsement of anti-religious
views, because of the university's sponsorship: the play was produced
as part of the curriculum, by a theater major for class credit, with
university financial support and faculty approval.54  The majority
based its holding on the university's right to control curriculum
immune from outside groups' disapproval, but also noted that the
theater was open to any school groups and that the administration
had made express disclaimers, which suggested a limited public
forum.' As discussed below, this distinction between government
151. Id. at 1072-73.
152. While this requirement parallels that which makes a public forum limited, rather
than designated, there is a difference because, as discussed throughout the Article,
"consistent practice" is hard to show when the content limits are subjective. The issue of
what "consistency" should be look like in government speech is treated infra Part III.B.
The selectivity requirement discussed here is one of process, of showing that action has
been taken to compare applicants with criteria. See, e.g., PETA v. Giuliani, 105 F. Supp.
2d 294, 301-02 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (court relied in part on the fact that city had also rejected
two other, non-PETA proposals as being outside the subjective standards). The proven
selectivity requirement holds true for the sponsor acknowledgments as well. See, e.g.,
KKK v. Univ. of Mo., 203 F.3d 1085, 1089 (8th Cir. 2000) (Eighth Circuit found useful the
evidence that radio station earlier had rejected other sponsors, including an adult
entertainment venue, as inconsistent with the show's image).
153. 260 F.3d 757 (7th Cir. 2001).
154. Id. at 762-65.
155. Id. at 759-60. See Lindsay Harrison, Note, The Problem With Posner as Art Critic:
Linnemeir v. Board of Trustees of Purdue University Fort Wayne, 37 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L.
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acknowledgment versus disclaimers lies at the heart of government
speech analysis."'
Ill. DISTINGUISHING THE TWO CONSTRUCTS:
TOWARD NEW MODELS OF GOVERNMENT SPEECH
This Part presents the case for why the special public purpose
forum should be treated as government speech, rather than its current
treatment as a limited public forum. It also offers justification for the
recent characterization of sponsor acknowledgments as government
speech. First, it situates these new contexts within the existing models
of analysis. Second, it shows how values-based selection could be
balanced with concerns about penalizing disfavored viewpoints, and
with little coercive effect. Third, it explains how the Establishment
Clause endorsement approach might be applied to the government
speech arena, both to explain the sponsor acknowledgment decisions
and to shed further light on the special public purpose forum. Finally,
this Article evaluates a number of existing municipal trends and
shows why the proposed extension of government speech will have a
net positive effect on the speech market.
A. Locating the New Models in the Existing Government Speech
Framework
How specific a policy message must the government have to fit
into the Rust model? What types of speech selection judgments,
other than those in public broadcasting and arts funding, fit into the
Forbes/Finley model? Both are open questions. As hybrids of the
two existing models, the special public purpose forum and the
endorsement relationship are likely candidates for a reasoned
extension and application of the government speech doctrine.
The special public purpose forum has elements of the Rust model
because in these programs government communicates through
private speakers. The policy messages are more broad and thematic,
however, than the straightforward anti-abortion stance in Rust. In the
case of banners, special events, public art projects and government
web sites, a government is communicating its own views on the city's
REV. 185 (2002) (criticizing rationale of decision because, while finding the university
theater a limited public forum would give student artists the right to select their works free
of viewpoint discrimination, upholding the university's right to control curriculum opens
the door to future restrictions of student and artistic freedom of speech).
156. See infra Part III.C. (discussion of why use of disclaimers is not sufficient).
Winter 20041 EXTENSIONS OF GOVERNMENT SPEECH
HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY
identity and purposes, what will draw tourists and investments, and
what image it should present to the larger world.157 In these contexts,
the government has joined forces with the private sector, sharing
resources and enhancing creativity, to convey its own broad,
subjective message, rather than to foster unlimited private speech.
Also, as in Finley, these types of criteria are not reducible to objective
content limitations, so that program goals are not achievable without
allowing discretionary selection.
Endorsement relationships, in particular sponsor
acknowledgments, require an additional analytical step because
frequently there is no expressive purpose to the program at issue.
Rather, government seeks to prevent its underlying identity messages,
such as that of promoting tolerance, from being undermined by a
forced public proclamation of a government partnership with a group
that stands for an antithetical message, such as intolerance. This
process also does not lend itself to concrete categories, and certainly
not to viewpoint-neutral ones. 'As discussed below,'58 the appearance
of endorsement also has relevance to a finding of government speech
in the special public purpose forum, hence this Article's use of the
broader term, endorsement relationship.
B. Disfavored Viewpoints and Coercive Effects
Although the essence of discretionary speech selection is that it is
not constrained by viewpoint neutrality, there are some ill-defined
outer limits to government's discretion. The Court in Finley
cautioned that the outcome might be different if government
"leverage[d] its power to award subsidies on the basis of subjective
criteria into a penalty on disfavored viewpoints" or "manipulated" a
subsidy to have a "coercive effect."'5 9 The plurality decision gave
little guidance on the scope or operation of these restraints, except to
say: "even in the provision of subsidies, the Government may not
'ai[m] at the suppression of dangerous ideas."" 6
157. But see Bezanson & Buss, supra note 18, at 1458-59 (asserting that in Finley the
government had a thematic message of a preference for decency over indecency, and
noting that the particular message of Rust is a "higher level" of government speech). The
special public purpose forum represents a middle level, in that NEA's "thematic" message
was more tied to excluding offensive material, while promotional identity messages have a
more affirmative substance.
158. See infra Part III.C.2.
159. Nat'l Endowment for the Arts v. Finley, 524 U.S. at 569, 587 (1998).
160. Id. (quoting Regan v. Taxation with Representation of Wash., 461 U.S. 540, 550
(1983)). Justice O'Connor was able to avoid grappling with the meaning of "penalizing
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The Finley dicta sounds indistinguishable from the stated rule for
limited public forums that content limitations not be "an effort to
suppress expression merely because public officials oppose the
speaker's view,.. but there must be some difference in the meaning.
This Article proposes a two-fold inquiry for interpreting the limits on
government speech. First, a government rejection of some disliked
message that does not have any relationship to its stated goals and
standards for the project should cross the line. Second, a viewpoint
distinction in a given program that tends to suppress a disfavored
view altogether because the government subsidy is so essential to a
significant number of speakers, should also constitute an indefensible
coercive effect.'62
Recalling the original reason for allowing discretionary speech
selection highlights the minimal distinction between the two
standards. In the limited public forum, abstract content limitations
usually are prohibited because they are conducive to viewpoint
discrimination; they give the government decision-maker too much
leeway to engage in hidden favoritism. That restriction clearly does
not apply to government speech, where allowing government
decision-makers room for discretionary selections, inserting their
points of view, is its essence.'63
disfavored viewpoints" by straining to characterize "artistic merit, taking into account
decency and American values" as viewpoint-neutral criteria. Justices Scalia, Thomas, and
Souter, however, saw clear viewpoint discrimination in the decency criteria and found it
disingenuous to pretend otherwise; Justice Souter found it unconstitutional, and the other
two found that it was perfectly appropriate in the subsidy context. Id. at 586, 592-93, 599-
601.
161. Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 46 (1983).
162. Note that while this Article seeks to interpret Rust and Finley, most of the
government speech commentary has been occupied with criticizing those two cases and
formulating alternatives. See, e.g., Redish & Kessler, supra note 18 ("negative" subsidies,
such as in Rust, which are used to induce changes in position are unconstitutional as are
subsidies of "judgmental necessity" when they use non-viewpoint neutral categories, such
as decency); Post, supra note 18 (any speech restrictions on subsidies should be
"instrumentally necessary to the attainment of legitimate managerial purposes," so that
Rust is unconstitutional, and should not interfere with "domains of public discourse");
Cole, supra note 18 (proposing theory of "structural accommodation," focused on
centrality of role of affected institutions to free expression and proscribing consideration
of more content than necessary, so that NEA standard unconstitutional).
163. Compare DeBoer v. Vill. of Oak Park, 267 F. 3d 558, 574 (7th Cir. 2001), a village
meeting room case, where the court struck down as overbroad the criterion that the
intended use "'benefit the public as a whole,' with PETA v. Guiliano, 105 F. Supp. 2d 294,
329 (S.D.N.Y. 2000), where the city's purpose was to produce a festive public art project
drawing tourists and citizens, and the comparable standard of "appropriate to a broad-
based audience" was upheld. Although the New York CowParade's criteria also could be
used to exclude non-mainstream expression, it visibly related to the program's expressive
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Along with prohibiting standards "conducive" to viewpoint
discrimination, the limited public forum approach bars any content
limit that expressly rejects a point of view, such as sexism or
homophobia. Again, this cannot be the rule for the special public
purpose forum because it involves intentionally value-laden messages.
Thus, whatever the contours of these principles in the straight speech
selection cases, in special public purpose forums the government by
definition needs the flexibility to exclude disfavored viewpoints that
contradict program goals.
The line should be drawn between decisions grounded in a
program's expressive purposes and those guided by an
administration's desire to suppress a disfavored point of view. The
most reliable litmus test would be to evaluate how the government
has treated other applicants, those similar in all respects but
viewpoint." Some outcome patterns might reflect more than
subjective judgments on whether an applicant met program policies,
and go too far by demonstrating a clear bias against disfavored
groups. To illustrate, consider if the NEA had been challenged by
Robert Maplethorpe and he could show that it had given grants for
numerous "indecent" works involving photographs of explicit sexual
acts by heterosexuals. Such a pattern might make refusal to fund
similar art featuring homosexuals look too much like disfavoring
unpopular viewpoints and make hollow its assertion of serving its
discretionary goal of artistic excellence coupled with decency. Or
consider New York City's rejection from its public art project of cows
displaying harsh, confrontational statements about eating meat based
on a policy that the displays be "festive." If it had accepted for
display cow sculptures broadcasting similarly graphic and jarring
statements, but relating to different subject matters, that might cross
goals.
Note that this distinction, between holding unconstitutional categories that are
conducive to viewpoint discrimination versus only those decisions that actually seek to
suppress a viewpoint, is reminiscent of the "divertability" issue in Establishment Clause
analysis. When analyzing the constitutionality of public aid to parochial schools, for many
years a key factor was whether the aid was divertable, that is, susceptible to being put to a
religious use. But recently, in Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793, 820 (2000), a majority of the
Court rejected that principle and determined that the Establishment Clause is violated
only where the public assets actually are diverted to religious use.
164. Note that, again parallel to the limited public forum approach, consistency in
application is used for two distinct purposes: to determine whether the government speech
paradigm applies at all, and if so, whether the rules of operating a government speech
program have been followed.
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the threshold hinted at in Finley.
1 65
Whether a given decision is unconstitutional also would depend
significantly on the nature of the program's stated goals and
standards. As shown above, if avoiding graphic, confrontational art is
the standard, then applying it inconsistently within that category
appears to penalize disfavored viewpoints. But in many special public
purpose forum and endorsement contexts, the government's very
point will be to promote its own substantive viewpoint on a
controversial issue. For example, a decidedly "green" municipal
government could undertake a public art display that included in its
criteria that the cows be decorated in accordance with the
administration's stand on environmental issues, which might include
encouraging vegetarianism. In that case, acceptance of the PETA
cow while rejecting other confrontational art as too offensive would
be defensible; indeed, a selection committee applying this standard
might find PETA's proposal to be merely educational.' 6
A commendable feature of this approach is that government
would only be permitted to make viewpoint distinctions where it does
so based on an express, publicly-stated policy. As noted above, the
special public purpose forum and the endorsement relationship differ
from Rust in that the private speakers are not simply carrying out a
government's uniform, concrete policy, but rather are adding their
own voices and perspectives to government's general themes. By
requiring that each decision relate visibly to a specific and publicly-
known standard, government would be politically accountable for its
selection policy.167  A focus on government's actual pattern of
165. Nat'l. Endowment of the Arts v. Finley, 524 U.S. 569 (1998). This test would not
be difficult to apply. Courts look at patterns of decision-making in determining liability in
numerous other contexts. E.g., Monell v. Dep't. of Soc. Serv., 436 U.S. 658, 690 (1978)
(establishing that government is liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for the acts of its officers
and employees when they act pursuant to an official government custom or policy of
discrimination); Int'l Brotherhood of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 336 (1977)
(statistical data that may show a pattern or practice of employment discrimination may be
used to support inference of Title VII violation in an individual case).
166. When the program's express goal is self-promotion by a government's
administration, then anti-government viewpoints will not be invited to participate. It
seems almost self-evident to characterize this as an example of government speech rather
than as a reasonable, viewpoint-neutral content limitation, as did Putnam II.
167. See Bd. of Regents v. Southworth, 529 U.S. 217, 235 (2000) (explaining that
political accountability is the rationale for allowing government to express viewpoint-
based messages, even through private speakers). Several recent commentators have
focused on government clearly identifying the message as its own as a requirement for
allowing viewpoint distinctions in government programs. See Bezanson & Buss, supra
note 18, at 1511; Greene, supra note 18, at 49 (naming potential problem of
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decision-making would help ensure that it will not have the room to
reject disliked speakers or messages surreptitiously, for reasons
unrelated to its official expressive purposes for the program at issue."
Turning to the second concern about government speech, its
potential "coercive effect, ' , 169 there are two intertwined issues:
whether the program's criteria or its nature forces private speakers to
modify or silence their own views to obtain needed subsidies, and the
impact of the program on the relevant speech market. Much
scholarly attention already has been devoted to the issue of
coercion;17° the purpose of this section is to give a brief overview of
the issues and to show that the special public purpose forum and
sponsor acknowledgments involve significantly less coercion than did
Rust and Finley.
The value of allowing viewpoint-based government speech lies in
what it adds to the marketplace of ideas: it should complement
existing outlets for speech and be one of many voices on any given
issue. Government speech looks most appealing and is easiest to
defend when it promotes a substantive policy, often with more
credibility and impact than any other speaker could effect. An
example of the least objectionable type of government speech would
be a public health advertisement campaign run by a state health
department to educate the public about the importance of safe sex for
disease control purposes. Even if the state hired an outside
advertising agency to perform the work, that company clearly would
"ventriloquism"). Cf. Jacobs, supra note 63, at 1387 (requires government accountability
for subjective categories used in "public sensibilities forums").
168. In addition, it may be necessary to have some rock bottom limit on the kinds of
selection standards that may be used, perhaps those that violate other constitutional or
statutory norms, such as by denigrating protected classes. See, e.g., Greene, supra note 18,
at 37 (identifying two types of viewpoint-based government speech that should always be
unconstitutional, that which (1) discriminates in favor of the existing administration and
against the opposition, or (2) promotes or criticizes a particular race, religion or gender)
(citing in support U.S. v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152-53 n.4 (1938), as
developed in JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 75-104 (1980)).
169. The precise language in Finley was directed at the suspect nature of
'manipulat[ing]' subsidies to have a 'coercive effect' and intentionally driving certain ideas
from the marketplace. 524 U.S. at 587. This focus on government's intentions is obscure,
however, because unless a government has acted solely to exclude a viewpoint without
reference to established criteria, as discussed above, then the relevance of coercion relates
to the actual impact of the government's program.
170. See Greene, supra note 18, at 47 (collecting articles finding most government
speech unduly coercive; he, however, interprets coercion extremely narrowly to state that
even if the NEA was the sole source of grant money, its restrictions would not be
coercive); Bezanson & Buss, supra note 18, at 1510 (concluding that government speech
should not be allowed to transform private speech to reflect government's viewpoint).
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be acting as the state's agent. Funding a group with that particular
mission, such as AIDS Action, to conduct the advertisement
campaign would not significantly change the analysis because the
group would not be changing its message to obtain government
support.
The Supreme Court cases approving government speech,
however, all involved significant modification of existing private
speech, especially in Rust, where the federal government transmitted
the administration's anti-abortion message through private health
practitioners. Because most of the affected private speakers in Rust
had a pre-existing and more general mission of health care or family
planning, government funding likely transformed their message from
counseling on the full range of medical options to a severely edited
speech. In Finley, too, it is likely that performers and artists modified
their presentations, or at least their applications to meet the new
grant criteria of decency and tradition; although that change is less
clear-cut.171
Whether giving a financial incentive to modify private speech is
inducement or coercion, however, depends on whether the speaker
realistically will be able to continue her speech activity without the
government grant. If the NEA funds most art in the country, so that
losing a subsidy from it would cause all but the most well-endowed or
commercially successful artists and artistic institutions to risk failure,
then a policy against indecency and for "American values" would
become coercive and dominate artistic expression. But if the NEA
funds a relatively small percentage of art and is one of many sources
of patronage for emerging artists, then government being able to
make selections without including all perspectives does not impair
artists' freedom of expression."'
The pervasiveness of government funding in a given area relates
not only to the rights of the speaker, but also to the impact the grant
condition has on the affected listeners who make up the relevant
171. Perhaps the least coercive of the Supreme Court cases would be Arkansas
Education. Television Commission v. Forbes, 523 U.S. 666 (1998), because in the public
broadcast context, the selection decisions are likely to be idiosyncratic, so that what
appealed to one producer or was appropriate for one program might not work with the
next. With little predictability as to what views will be rewarded, less change would be
expected.
172. See Post, supra note 18, at 194 n.208 (noting the uncertainty of actual extent of the
art world's dependence on NEA grants, he states that NEA grants constitute 5% of
donated funds, which does not include earned income, but also does not measure the
leveraging effect of matching grants and increased prestige).
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speech market. If all or most community health clinics that do family
planning need federal funding to survive, then the impact of a
statutory restriction on advising women on abortion severely curtails
significant speech and effectively limits exposure to a viewpoint for a
large subset of the population. But if a large majority of health care
facilities, including those serving low-income patients with fewer
options, remain free to give counsel on all medical options, then
government promotion of its preferred moral position through some
private speakers is less threatening to freedom of speech. The
presence or absence of a government monopoly of a speech market
indicates whether there is coercion in a broader sense, as in whether
the program overall has extinguished disfavored viewpoints.
Special public purpose forums and sponsor acknowledgments are
far less likely to have a coercive impact on freedom of speech than
did either Rust or Finley. Broadcasting one's message on a city street
light pole or web page, or by virtue of acting as a city sponsor is
simply one of many outlets for expression. In addition, most of the
venues are new or recent, so there is little in the way of established
expectations; these contexts do not resemble those where the
government gives monetary incentives to existing private speakers to
change their views. Moreover, none of these examples involve funds
for ongoing operations, funds that organizations or individuals may
become dependent on to continue their expressive activity. The only
context that bears some resemblance to NEA funding is government
subsidies for privately-produced special events; whether there is any
coercive effect would depend on the facts. On the whole, there is
little, if any, threat of coercive impact from these proposed extensions
of the government speech doctrine.
C. The Endorsement Relationship
Several courts have suggested, though not held, that there may
be certain kinds of relationships between a government and private
entities that are so close that the reasonable person would think the
government was sending a message of endorsement of those entities,
and that this might be a basis for finding government speech. Thus,
the government would be allowed to reject those whom it would not
choose to endorse.'73  Most judicial analysis of when a given
interaction looks like government endorsement of a private speaker's
message has involved religious speech and the Establishment Clause.
173. See infra Part III.C.2.
[Vol. 31:2
Winter 2004] EXTENSIONS OF GOVERNMENT SPEECH
The two contexts are quite different, of course, in that the
Establishment Clause imposes an affirmative obligation on
government to avoid the appearance of government approval of
religious speech. 4 With offensive speech, on the other hand, it is the
government that would like avoid the appearance of endorsing
offensive speech. Not only is there no constitutional requirement that
it do so, but the First Amendment generally requires no
discrimination against offensive speech. Nonetheless, the religious
speech cases still are helpful because they show what factors into the
appearance of endorsement. As discussed below, importing these
concepts into the area of government speech is appropriate because it
allows government to express broad messages about its principles and
to structure programs to reflect its intent in initiating them.
1. Establishment Clause Cases.
Under the "endorsement test," the Establishment Clause is
violated if a reasonable observer would view a government's speech
or actions, or that of a private party using government property or
resources, as a government endorsement of a religious message. The
endorsement test originated in a line of cases involving Christmas
holiday displays, beginning with the foundation case of County of
Allegheny v. ACLU.'75 In that case, a city had allowed a private
organization to display a creche, standing alone, on the prominent
grand staircase of the city-county building.176 The organization's
status as the only one permitted, together with the display's
placement in a location not otherwise open to private expressive
activity, indicated government approval of its fundamentally
Christian message."'
174. The Establishment Clause "imposes affirmative obligations that may require a
State, in some situations, to take steps to avoid being perceived as supporting or endorsing
a private religious message." Capital Square Review & Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S.
753, 777 (1995) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
175. 492 U.S. 573 (1989); Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 694 (1984) (O'Connor, J.,
concurring) (city's inclusion of a creche as part of a larger holiday display did not violate
Establishment Clause because it conveyed no endorsement of religion).
176. Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 579.
177. Id. at 599-602. Note that the cases involving religious speech actually involve two
separate questions. The first one, whether it looks from the context like government is
endorsing the private speech at issue, is relevant beyond religious speech, and is discussed
here. The second is whether given speech, either by the government or attributed to the
government, is in fact religious in nature. Thus, Supreme Court holiday display cases
establish the general rule that where a creche is accompanied by sufficient reindeer,
Christmas trees, Santa Clauses and snowmen, then the message sent is secular and
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At the other end of the spectrum, for a city to allow private
display of a religious symbol in a traditional public forum would not
send that unconstitutional message if the display was permitted under
content-neutral guidelines. This is particularly true for locations that
many others have used for private speech activities that were clearly
not endorsed by the state, including political protests."' Under those
circumstances, in Capital Square Review & Advisory Board v.
Pinette 79 the Court held that the First Amendment required Ohio to
permit the KKK to display a cross in the statehouse square.'8° While
Justice Scalia's plurality opinion broadly opined that private religious
speech in a traditional public forum could never violate the
Establishment Clause, five justices reaffirmed the endorsement test,
so it survived Capital Square.'8' Significant to the decision was the
government's ability to avoid perceived endorsement by means of a
disclaimer that was effective because it was visible to its audience and
clearly disassociated the state from the private religious message.182
In addition to the number and range of private speakers allowed,
other factors include the nature of the particular context and how
government structures its program. For example, in Linnemeir, the
reasonable observer would be familiar with the expectation of
academic freedom at a university, and the school generally issued
express disclaimers of control over content, which in the case at issue
had been well publicized. Conversely, in Gentala, that the
celebratory, not religious, so that sending it does not violate the Establishment Clause.
Lynch, 465 U.S. at 691-93. See also Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 619-20; Wells v. City and
County of Denver, 257 F.3d 1132, 1137 (10th Cir. 2001) (appearing to follow this rule
without discussing it).
178. Pinette, 515 U.S. at 757, 770.
179. Id.
180. Note that despite the involvement of the KKK, the case was limited to the
religious speech issue - whether allowing a cross in the public square would violate the
Establishment Clause - and as framed by the parties, ignored the political reasons the
state wanted to reject this particular party's symbol. Id. at 759-60.
181. The three concurring justices disagreed that there should be any exception to the
endorsement test for the public forum context, but thought there was no realistic danger
that the community would perceive endorsement of religion in that case. See id. at 772-83
(O'Connor, J., concurring); id. at 783-98 (Souter, J., concurring). The two dissenting
justices also affirmed the endorsement test. See id. at 797-816 (Stevens, J., dissenting); id.
at 817-18 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
182. See id. at 782 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (disclaimer an important factor in
endorsement test); id. at 793-94 (Souter, J., concurring) (because there it was possible to
avoid the appearance of endorsement by an effective disclaimer, the state did not have the
right to deny the KKK participation in a traditional public forum); id. at 818 (Ginsburg, J.,
dissenting) (finding that appearance of large cross dominating square was endorsement
problem and reserving the question of whether better disclaimer could change that).
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government required all events subsidized by the Civic Events Fund
to publicly acknowledge the city's joint sponsorship strongly
supported a conclusion that the city approved of the content of all
such productions.
2. Cases Looking at Endorsement Outside the Religious Speech Context.
In two situations where government sought to avoid a forced
association with the KKK, courts have applied the principles of the
Establishment Clause endorsement cases, without directly
confronting their applicability or whether the appearance of
endorsement results in a finding of government speech.
The Adopt-a-Highway Program cases,183 where states have most
vigorously asserted this argument, involved facts that would not
resemble endorsement even if there were a religious message at issue.
As discussed above,"84 in the Adopt-a-Highway Program, groups
agree to keep a stretch of highway clean, in return for which a sign is
posted acknowledging their work. While it includes only the
sponsor's name, the sign is arguably intended to, and does, send the
message that the state is acknowledging the organization as a good
citizen, working for the community good.185 States have argued that
allowing the KKK to assume a function of the state, and then
publicizing that role, would look like state endorsement of the KKK's
discriminatory message. '  For that reason, they claim the state
should be able to avoid this unwanted attribution and deny the
KKK's applications to participate."
183. KKK v. Arkansas State Highway Dep't, 807 F. Supp. 1427, 1436 (D. Ark. 1992);
Cuffley v. Mickes, 208 F.3d 702, 708-09 (8th Cir. 2000), cert. denied sub nom. Yarnell v.
Cuffley, 532 U.S. 903 (2001).
184. See discussion supra Part I.B.3.
185. Arkansas State Highway Dep't, 807 F. Supp. at 1436.
186. Id.; Cuffley, 208 F.3d at 708-09.
187. Most recently, in Cuffley, 208 F.3d at 708-09, this argument took the form of a
convoluted and sketchy state action claim, which the Eighth Circuit rejected. The state,
relying on Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, 365 U.S. 715 (1961), had asserted that
entering into such a relationship would subject it to liability under the Fourteenth
Amendment for the KKK's discrimination. The court held that Burton was inapposite,
because the highway beautification program was not the kind of relationship that was
extensive enough to make private discrimination into state action.
Compare the state action discussion supra at note 108, regarding whether a city
could delegate forum decision-making to a private entity and thereby avoid the First
Amendment issue. Here, the forum access decisions clearly were made by the state, but it
argued that the KKK's general policy of discrimination would be attributed to the state by
virtue of its participation in the program, and make the state liable for the any
discriminatory action by the KKK, even though such actions were completely unrelated to
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The one court to address the endorsement argument directly
held that simply allowing the KKK to pick up litter and posting a sign
stating that it has done so would not show government support of its
policies."8 This was especially likely, the court found, because of the
broad range of the hundreds of groups listed on the signs, which
included organizations that no one would think the state was
purposefully endorsing, such as Baptist churches and the National
Organization for the Reform of Marijuana Laws."8  Because this
context is little different from that in Capital Square'9° in terms of its
neutral application and open access, it fails to shed much light on the
question of the test's applicability to disliked speech.
In holding that underwriter acknowledgments are government
speech, not that of the sponsors, the University of Missouri public
broadcasting case came closer to approving of the endorsement
argument.' 9' In support of its holding, the Eighth Circuit noted that
the reasonable listener, hearing the station announce that the KKK
was one of its sponsors, likely would perceive that acknowledgment
as government speech.'9 The court contrasted these sponsor
acknowledgments with a letters-to-the-editor section, such as the one
published in the government magazine at issue in Bryant v. Secretary
of the Army.9  In Bryant, the court rejected a government speech
argument because even though the letters sometimes were edited by
the government publisher, the reasonable observer would see them as
obviously the opinion of the letter writer.' 94 Although the Eighth
Circuit did not speak in terms of endorsement, it did suggest that the
public perception that the speech was coming from the government,
rather than from independent individuals, is relevant to a finding of
government speech. Categorizing it as government speech in turn
allows government to reject those private speakers that are dissonant
with its values. No court has been directly confronted with this claim,
however.1 95
the highway program, which is a very far-fetched claim.
188. Arkansas State Highway Dep't, 807 F. Supp. at 1436.
189. Id. at 1427.
190. Capital Square Review & Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753 (1995). See
discussion supra Part III.C.1.
191. KKK v. Curators of the Univ. of Mo., 203 F.3d 1085 (8th Cir. 2000).
192. Id. at 1094 n.9.
193. 862 F. Supp. 574, 580 (D. D.C. 1994).
194. Id.
195. In University of Missouri, the Eighth Circuit could rely on the editorial discretion
in the public broadcasting context, but the Adopt-a-Highway cases did not have the right
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3. Why and When Endorsement Matters to Non-Religious Government
Speech.
The most straightforward way of interpreting the University of
Missouri case is to cite the Eighth Circuit's observation that there is
no First Amendment right to have one's money accepted as a
contribution to a government enterprise, and thus no corresponding
right to make the government publicly thank the individual for that
money.' 96 That is a facile solution, though, because the transit-
advertising forum equally can be described as a situation in which
companies give the government money in exchange for name
exposure on nonpublic property.
Similarly, the Adopt-a-Highway cases could be portrayed the
same way, but there was a different outcome. The courts could have
said that there is no First Amendment right to be allowed to clean up
a public highway, and thus no corresponding right to force the
government to acknowledge an organization's work and publicize its
name. Also, in that program, like in University of Missouri and Wells,
the government did the actual speaking." The government
determined the content of the signs, put up and maintained them. In
fact, in one sense, the situation in University of Missouri was more
like an advertising forum than the Adopt-a-Highway program
because there the sponsors submitted their slogans and a brief self-
description to be read as part of the on-air acknowledgment.
198
The only real difference between the two contexts is that one
appeared to be government endorsement of the private party's
message, and the other did not. What should be essential to the
reasonable observer is both the nature of the affiliation and the
government's relationship overall to all the speakers in the program
or venue. The relationship between a radio station and its
underwriters appears more intimate than that arising from accepting
facts to find endorsement. One decision, however, found the appearance of endorsement
a valid consideration even in administering a type of public forum. Cf Piarowski v. I11.
Community Coll. Dist. 515, 759 F.2d 625 (7th Cir. 1985) (holding that where college art
teacher's sexually explicit paintings were relocated from a college art gallery to another
part of the school, even if the gallery was a public forum, the school had the right to
relocate offensively graphic art to a less visible location. If the display had remained in a
prominent location near the main school entrance, especially since the artist was a faculty
member and administrator, it might have looked like that school was endorsing the art's
message, which it had the right to avoid).
196. 203 F.3d at 1094 n.8.
197. Id. at 1094; Wells v. Denver, 257 F.3d 1132 (10th Cir. 2001), cert denied, 534 U.S.
997 (2001).
198. 203 F.3d at 1088 n.8.
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assistance in highway cleanup. Where government enters into some
type of close affiliation with the speakers, which suggests a
partnership or other type of joint enterprise, the selection will look
more like endorsement and, correspondingly it is more likely that a
court will find government speech."9 The fewer the number of
sponsors or partners involved in a project, the more comparable to
Allegheny,2° and the more likely the appearance of endorsement,
while a large number and broad range of speakers, including those
whose views government clearly would not choose to endorse, would
be similar to Capital Square and show little likelihood of unwanted
attribution. 1
The essence of why endorsement matters is that requiring the
relationship would force government to say it approves of something
when it does not. One way of conceptualizing it is that the
government speech at issue in these cases is the administration's
implied message of what it values, what it stands for. Where the
context does not suggest endorsement, then allowing access to a
disapproved-of group does not interfere with the government's
implied identity message. Where the government's relationship with
the private entities does connote endorsement, however, forcing
inclusion alters the message that government sends. This claim - that
the law should not force endorsement because that would be akin to
changing the government's speech or forcing it to "say" something it
does not want to say - is related to questions about the legitimacy of
199. Gentala v. Tucson, 244 F.3d 1065, 1079 (9th Cir. 2001) (en banc) vacated by 534
U.S. 946 (2001), remanded 275 F.3d 1160 (9th Cir. 2002) (demonstrating well how the
factors which show that a government is speaking through its selection of the speech of
others are the same as those which suggest government endorsement of the messages of
those private speakers. This similarity was brought out because the case involved
requested funding for a religious event, so that the court explicitly applied the
Establishment Clause's endorsement test. The Ninth Circuit found that the policy and
application "make clear that the Civic Events Fund program is meant to endorse some
events as 'Civic Events' worthy of the City's imprimatur." The subjective funding criteria,
and the role of the mayor and city council in applying those criteria, suggest that "the City
has retained a role for itself something like that of impresario, selecting the events that are
consistent with the image of Tucson that the City wishes to foster and that therefore merit
public subsidy.").
200. 492 U.S. 533 (1989).
201. See 515 U.S. 753, 757, 770 (1995). It should not, however, be necessary to show, as
in the Adopt-a-Highway cases, that previously accepted participants included those the
government clearly would not endorse. Such a requirement might lead governments to try
to exclude potential speakers for the sole purpose of establishing that the program was
government speech, which would be an undesirable effect. Rather, a large number and
broad range of participants, in and of itself, should be a factor in determining the
likelihood of attribution, along with the degree and character of the relationship.
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and rationale for government speech generally.
What is the source of government's right to send an implied
message of its values, which should not be interfered with by forced
endorsement of a proposed speaker? At first blush, the claim appears
to be one of government right to free speech. Under Hurley v. Irish-
American Gay Group of Boston,02 the First Amendment protects the
right not to say something, as well as to say it. There, parade
organizers could not be forced by the application of public
accommodation laws to include gay and lesbian groups in their St.
Patrick's Day parade because that would convey the message that the
parade organizers endorsed a lifestyle with which they vehemently
disagreed. 23  But the First Amendment protects individual's free
speech rights from infringement by the government; it does not exist
to protect the government from free speech claims by would-be
speakers.
Instead, the nature of the government's claim is structural. It is a
"right" only in contrast to the obligation that government is under
with respect to avoiding the appearance of endorsement of religious
speech. The claim is based on the reality that governments are
elected to promote certain values, often to the exclusion of others. A
"family values" administration might not want to accept funding from
or collaborate with groups advocating gay rights, while one focused
on diversity would be loath to fund or partner with an anti-
immigration group. The fear, though, is that allowing government to
avoid unwanted attribution would foster divisiveness: "outsiders" will
be excluded, while "insiders" will be rewarded by opportunities for
self-promotion. As explained in Southworth 2°4 however, the answer
to that concern lies in the democratic process: one term's insiders can
be next term's outsiders.
In evaluating the claim that government has a right to send a
message about its values without being forced to alter that message
by entering into unwanted affiliations, it is important to look back to
the prerequisite for creating a limited public forum: government
intent to open its property to private speech. Without such intent and
action, private speakers generally have no right to use government
property or subsidies for speech purposes. Where no forum is
created, then there is no First Amendment protected speech rights on
202. 515 U.S. 557 (1995).
203. Id. at 574.
204. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Wis. Sys. v. Southworth, 529 U.S. 217, 234 (2000);
See discussion supra Part II.A.
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that property, or created by that program. Where the relationship is
such that forced inclusion of a speaker or message would look like
endorsement and distort government's own message, doing so should
not be required in a context where the private speaker does not
generally have access, and has not acquired any rights to speak under
forum analysis. In choosing sponsors and partners, government does
not intend to open a forum for private speech, but rather to obtain
assistance to leverage its own ability to act.
A final issue is whether government should simply be required to
avoid unwanted attribution by issuing strong, effective disclaimers.
Commentators who have rejected the endorsement argument point to
government's ability to disavow any unintended message of approval
by means of disclaimer or other clarifying speech, or, alternatively, by
how it structures the program. °5 One problem with that approach,
however, is that in many contexts a disclaimer would not be effective.
The cases discussed here where disclaimers were issued involved
universities relinquishing control over students' subsidized speech, a
situation where observers would expect that students speak on their
own behalf, enjoying full academic freedom. In contrast, requiring a
disclaimer on every street light pole banner is not practical: it would
be either indecipherable or unattractive. An effort to disclaim
endorsement of key sponsors would lack credibility. And finally,
when government seeks to partner with the private sector, sometimes
it wants acknowledgment and public credit for its role as a systematic
feature of the program, as in Gentala. 206
In a recent article, Professors Bezanson and Buss analyzed the
unwanted attribution argument asserted in Cuffley v. Mickes and
concluded that avoiding the appearance of endorsement is never a
valid basis for allowing government a right not to speak.0 7 They
argue that where government has no intent to speak, it should not be
allowed to make viewpoint distinctions solely to avoid having third
parties mistakenly deduce that it approves of the private speaker.
Looking to Establishment Clause usage, however, Justice O'Connor
has observed that unconstitutional endorsement is not premised on
the viewer's mistake; rather, it is "the State's own actions (operating
the forum in a particular manner and permitting the religious
expression to take place therein), and the relationship to the private
205. See Jacobs, supra note 63, at 1398-1400 (2001); Bezanson & Buss, supra note 18, at
1482.
206. 244 F.3d 1065.
207. Benzanson & Buss, supra note 18, at 1482.
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speech at issue, [that] actually convey a message of endorsement.28
The context is different, of course, in that government is not required
to structure its affairs to avoid attribution of disliked, nonreligious
messages, but the principle has meaning here too. The appearance of
endorsement of the KKK, for example, results not from mistaken
attribution, but by virtue of how the state has chosen to structure its
program, and the nature of the relationship it sets up with private
speakers. Where a government intends to create a close relationship
in which the private and the public realm each gets credit and
acknowledgment for its contribution to a joint enterprise, the
government should not be forced to structure its relationships and
programs differently in order to avoid potential, and reasonable,
attribution of approval of the participants.
Another major objection to the endorsement approach is its
potential limitlessness. They argue that all regulatory action might be
included, and give as an example a state claiming the right to refuse a
waste permit to a company involved in scandal, because "small-
minded" people might associate the government with the views of any
of its beneficiaries.2 The Establishment Clause endorsement test, of
course, relies on the understanding of the "reasonable" observer,21 °
and the approach put forth here requires a close, and acknowledged,
affiliation. In the Adopt-a-Highway cases, it would have been
unreasonable to attribute government approval of all the participants,
while announcing the underwriters of the public radio show in the
University of Missouri case suggested government approval of its
apparent partners. The types of relationships where the appearance
of endorsement would allow government to take its views into
account when making its choice of partners are far from limitless.
Although the inquiry will be fact-intensive, so is the analysis in the
Establishment Clause endorsement cases, with which the judiciary
has substantial experience.
208. Capital Square Review & Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753, 777 (1953)
(O'Connor, J., concurring).
209. See Bezanson & Buss, supra note 18, at 1479.
210. There is some debate over the sophistication of that reasonable observer, but
"reasonable" is the baseline. See Capital Square, 515 U.S. at 779-80 (O'Connor, J.,
concurring) (holding that the reasonable observer "is presumed to possess a certain level
of information that all citizens might not share.... [and is] "deemed aware of the history
and context of the community and forum in which the religious display appears."). But see
id. at 799, 800 n.5 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (calling for a test that captures the impact of a
visual symbol, there a cross on the square, on the typical passerby).
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D. Application of These Paradigms to Examples
1. Decorative Banners on City Street Light Poles.
In recent years, many municipalities have joined a growing trend
to improve urban appearance by displaying decorative banners on
their street light poles .21  Typically, such banners contain colorful,
attractive graphics and a limited number of words. Most commonly,
they proclaim the identity of the town or shopping district, celebrate a
local institution, or promote a public festivity. In some municipalities,
all banners are created, erected, and maintained by the city itself;
then there should be no question that they constitute government
speech and that the city retains control over all content. In others,
though, the policy also is to allow some private speakers use of the
light poles to display banners that meet the city's expressive
purposes.212 In those cases, the question arises whether the context is
more like a limited public forum or more like government speech and
what kinds of programs would be possible under the differing
approaches.
Following current case law, a court almost certainly would begin
its analysis by looking at whether the city had opened up a limited
public forum or created a designated public forum, open to all. Street
light poles, particularly their tops which require special equipment to
access, are nonpublic property that is not generally open to the public
for any purpose, including speech. A court thus would analyze the
government's intent in allowing access, as reflected in both the
written policy and the actual practice. Cities generally want to
accomplish broad objectives such as enhancing the beauty of the
street scape, celebrating the diverse, positive features of the city, and
appealing to tourists. An effort to provide more specific criteria for
the kinds of banners municipalities currently display might reference
the city's important institutions, not-for-profit public events,
community initiatives, and neighborhoods.
One problem inherent with this traditional approach is that there
are almost no descriptive categories that would exclude a banner that
undermines the government's expressive purposes or contravenes
public policy. For example, "public events in the city" would include
two events that took place in the Chicago area: "Freaknic," which
211. A recent Nexus search collected several hundred articles referencing street light
pole banners in both large cities and small towns.
212. See, e.g., CHI., ILL. MUNICIPAL CODE, § 10-8-340 (1996) (allowing donated
banners).
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caused public chaos and resulted in numerous arrests, 'and
"Hempfest," which encouraged and resulted in public marijuana
use.213 To say that it would be inappropriate to display banners
promoting such events through a government program, of course, in
no way undermines the organizers' First Amendment rights to
produce these events in a public forum or to advertise and discuss
them through private means."' That distinction - between line
drawing and suppression - is fundamental. But defining content
limitations in a way that avoids such problems, without allowing for
administrators' discretion and thus viewpoint, is an impossible task.
No matter how the categories are framed to target only the desired
types of displays, someone has to decide whether a given institution is
"significant" or "cultural," for example, and consistency over the
years is not achievable.
Such a banner program is another example of the "special public
purpose forum," which should be deemed government speech, so
long as all proposals are carefully screened for adherence to program
criteria. Cities have expressive purposes when initiating a banner
program - to be welcoming, aesthetically pleasing, and promote the
government's vision of the city at its most attractive - and they cannot
be reduced to objective content limitations. In addition, the nature of
the government property and its prominence suggest city
endorsement of the messages placed there. Also, these banners are
not amenable to disclaimers, which would either be hard to see or
interfere with their decorative quality, so it would be difficult for
government to disassociate itself with their stated messages.
One approach that may make banners produced by private
speakers look more like government speech would be to include a
banner program as part of a city's overall public relations plan
directed at boosting tourism. Alternatively, all privately-sponsored
decorative banners could be linked to other forms of government
speech. The criterion for inclusion might be that all banners must
213. See Phat X. Chiem & Andrew Martin, "Freaknic" Fest May Be the Last; Answers
Demanded After Chaos Erupts, CHI. TRIB., Aug. 4, 1998, at M1 (noting that picnic in park
with 4,000 attendees resulted in chaos and twenty-one arrests, including for marijuana
possession and a shooting); Hempfest Attendance is Down; Police Make 3 Arrests, CHI.
TRIB., May 10, 1998, at M10 (noting that after event to support legalization of marijuana
was changed from event in the park to a march, it decreased from thousands of
participants to hundreds, but still resulted in three arrests for marijuana use).
214. Note that even those traditional public forum rights are not without limits for
groups with a track record of law breaking. See Thomas v. Chi. Park Dist., 534 U.S. 316
(2002) (holding that Park District could deny permit to Hempfest based on past violations
of park regulations).
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promote an activity or institution sponsored or subsidized by the city
or a related government entity. Bootstrapping a banner program
onto various other programs that themselves look more like
government speech might improve government's chances of retaining
control of content, but would limit the banner program's scope and
flexibility.
If private banners are characterized as limited public forums,
however, then government will have to limit the permissible content
limitations in a very restrictive fashion, such as by permitting only
neighborhood chambers of commerce or other retail associations to
display banners, while also limiting the subject matter to
neighborhood identification, a decorative graphic, and a small
sponsor name.215 Such concrete and narrow parameters would be
defensible and easy to enforce.216
These ideas, however, simply underscore the deficiency of the
limited public forum approach in the context of a special public
purpose forum. Applying this approach to a banner program severely
restricts its potential because cities cannot achieve the full range of
their expressive goals without discretionary speech selection.
Characterizing street light pole banners as government speech is good
public policy because banner programs are wholly additive speech.
They create a new avenue for public expression and, as such, have no
coercive impact on prior existing speech.
2. City Sponsorship of Special Events and Corporate Sponsorship of City
Projects.
First, it has become fairly common for cities to sponsor or
provide some level of support to the special events of private groups
in a wide range of scenarios. The more the program targets a certain
kind of event with particular city goals in mind, the more likely the
subsidies would be deemed government speech. For example,
consider a program for city support of neighborhood festivals. It
could be structured so that any group seeking to produce one simply
fills out an application requesting city services and equipment, which
is granted as a matter of course. Doing it this way would create a
215. Under Wells, the mere identification of a sponsor should not alter the nature of
the display. 257 F.3d at 1140.
216. Such a policy could even be construed as government speech, on the grounds that
the chambers and associations are acting as agents of the city, to transmit its own message
of publicizing and encouraging shopping in its city street retail areas. Finding government
speech here, however, would not expand a city's expressive outlets, because it would be
premised on the limited context.
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limited or designated public forum, so that the city would not be able
to turn down any group based on their message. Alternatively, the
program could be established to achieve city goals, say,
hypothetically, "improving community relations by sponsoring events
which are supported by established neighborhood groups, highlight
the unique characteristics of that neighborhood, and are consistent
with city policies on diversity and tolerance." If each proposal was
carefully evaluated, and selection was based on adherence to these
standards, the program would look more like government speech.
Modifiers such as "unique" and "established" require discretionary
speech selection, and such subsidies have a governmental expressive
component as well. This characterization would allow the city to
retain control over the kinds of events it sponsors, with no damage to
First Amendment freedoms.
Second, it has become customary, when cities produce their own
special events, to obtain corporate sponsors to help underwrite the
costs. In return, such sponsors usually are heavily promoted through
signs around the event, mentions in promotional materials and
program notes, and sometimes insertion into the name of the event,
such as, hypothetically, Sear's Taste of Milwaukee. Where the city
writes, edits and promulgates all such material, under KKK v.
University of Missouri and Wells, it should be considered government
speech and trigger no rights of access by other speakers.
The result becomes less certain where the sponsors display their
own messages. It is fairly common to allow the larger contributors to
use the event grounds for advertising, often by displaying large
banners with their logos and slogans. At the next level, where only
advertising approved and edited by the city is permitted, it still is
likely to be within KKK v. University of Missouri. Although that case
involved journalistic discretion, the court emphasized that radio staff
sometimes edited the sponsor messages.217
Choice of sponsors could also be deemed government speech
based on the appearance of government endorsement of those
selected sponsors. This would depend on whether the city truly was
selective in its choice of sponsors or simply accepted all who offered
money. Also, if there were a large number of sponsors, especially if
the speech included selections that arguably contravened public
policy such as alcohol or cigarette ads directed at younger audiences,
then event sponsorship would start to resemble the transit-advertising
217. 203 F.3d at 1094.
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context. If participation is too broad, a court might find an "event
advertising" public forum. At the other end of the spectrum, where
an event is co-produced by the city and a corporation, such a
relationship extends beyond the context of acknowledgments of
sponsors. There is no First Amendment right to enter into a joint
venture with a government entity, even to produce an event with
some expressive component.
Even without an endorsement relationship or government
control over the content of sponsor messages, if sponsor selection is
done pursuant to an inherently discretionary standard it still may
come within the Finlay speech selection model. For example, if the
intended audience of the event were families with young children,
sponsorship could be limited to businesses selling goods and services
appealing to that demographic. Criteria related to children could
screen out some negative associations, while screening in those
consistent with attracting families to the city.
Finally, viewing the acknowledgment and promotion of sponsors
as government speech will increase, not diminish, speech
opportunities. Allowing a city the ability to select its sponsors, and
provide them incentives to participate, encourages cities to undertake
this sort of expressive event. In contrast, forced affiliation with any
entity that offers to give money for an event could result in a net
decrease of speech: cities might choose to stop using sponsors, and
then have to scale down or discontinue their events.
3. Government Web Sites.
A final example is the new and growing phenomenon of
government web sites. Generally a municipality will start a web site
for the purpose of communicating with its residents, as well as
potential tourists, businesses, and other users, about the city
government, attractions, events, and opportunities. These web sites
have expanded in complexity as cities feature news and information
from their departments and agencies, and sites are increasingly
interactive, allowing citizens to register for programs, make inquiries,
and convey opinions.18 The city web page itself, as a statement from
and about the government, clearly is government speech. But two
new developments that bring private speech onto the official sites,
218. See, e.g., New York City web site, at http://www.nyc.gov; Official Web Site of the
City of Los Angeles, at http://www.ci.la.ca.us; City of Chicago web site, at
http://www.ci.chi.il.us.
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Internet links and advertising, raise novel First Amendment issues.
219
Typically a city's home page will have both internal links, such as
to pages for each department and pages for citizens to use for making
complaints or obtaining permits, and external links. The most
frequent examples of external links are those featuring the tourist
attractions of the area, including cultural institutions, shopping and
restaurants.220 The question arises whether allowing any links opens a
designated or limited public forum, or whether the links can be
characterized as an extension of the web site's government speech,
which would give a city more control over selecting the sites given
links.
Looking to the first such case, Putnam Pit,22' a court likely would
first ask whether the city has created a designated or limited public
forum, and then evaluate the policy and categories. For example,
under existing limited public forum law it would be unconstitutional
viewpoint discrimination for a site with links to entertainment and
restaurants to reject a request to include links to "gentleman's clubs"
and "Hooters" because the city did not want to promote entities that
demean women.
Because one purpose of establishing a city web site is to promote
the most appealing features of the city, which also are in harmony
with public policy, link selection should be considered government
speech. Government has an expressive purpose and the
accomplishment of this purpose requires discretionary speech
selection. A government website is also a context where the public
will perceive government approval of all sites the city has chosen to
post on its official web site. While a disclaimer is easily done and
would be clearly visible to all viewers, governments would not choose
to structure their web sites in a way that relinquishes control over
content. If forced to accept web sites that are against public policy, a
disclaimer might not be credible without some statement that because
of the First Amendment, the city has no control over selection of
Internet links.
One factor that undercuts the contention that links are
government speech, however, is the loose, uncontrolled nature of the
Internet. Once a city establishes a link, it has no control over where
219. No legal scholarship has addressed these new concepts; to date, attention has
been addressed only to the issue of Internet access. See Gey, supra note 110 (criticizing
attempted government restrictions of Internet content and public access in libraries).
220. See supra note 218.
221. 221 F.3d at 842-44.
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that link leads or how that site is modified. Because the link will not
be to some static message, knowable in advance, government may not
have the ability to be consistently selective enough to sustain a
finding of government speech. At a minimum, the city would need to
undertake a review of its links regularly, which militates against
having a large number of links.
One alternative approach that would finesse the possibility of
loss of control over link contents would be to authorize connection
only to established organizations, such as Chambers of Commerce,
Tourism Councils, retail associations, and restaurant guides, so that
no selection of individual sites, events, restaurants and so forth is
done by the government. Even if deemed a limited public forum, the
opportunity and need for viewpoint distinctions when selecting
among such groups would be minimal. Doing so is distinguishable
from the unsuccessful attempts to avoid implicating the First
Amendment by delegating advertising decisions to a private agency.222
This context does not resemble the transit advertising forums because
those forums involve discrete physical spaces, so that there the
administrator is parceling out limited spots on government's property.
In contrast, the links that councils and chambers choose for their own
home pages will not be seen on or have any direct relationship with
the government web site. This approach, however, would
significantly limit governments' ability to be creative and flexible in
the rapidly changing Internet world.
Recognizing Internet link selection for city web sites as
government speech benefits the speech market overall because a city
will have the opportunity to communicate its own vision of city
attractions and policies, without being hijacked by private speakers
with contrary messages. And given the infinitely open and extensive
communication possible on the Internet, exclusion from a particular
governmental unit's web site in no way inhibits a private entity's
expressive opportunities, so coercion is not an issue. Finally,
providing governments with editorial discretion over link selection by
means of the government speech paradigm is preferable to the
approach used in Putnam II, because discretion is the essence of
government speech, while the vast majority of limited public forum
cases stress the need for objective content limitations and the test is
framed in terms of viewpoint neutrality. Labeling link selection as
government speech is the only reliable method of ensuring such
222. See supra note 108.
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discretion with any level of predictability.
An additional new development involves bringing Internet
advertising to government web pages. Several governments have
contracted with an Internet company which takes responsibility for
the costs and expertise required to develop and maintain a complex
web site in exchange for administering a program allowing banner ads
on the government site."3 A number of other governments have
considered or are considering allowing such advertising; while the
trend has stalled in light of recent Internet advertising revenue losses,
the issue will be recurring."'
A court likely would evaluate the advertising portion of a city
web site as a designated or limited public forum because it is similar
to transit advertising forums. The purpose of opening a web page to
advertising is revenue-raising, not expressive. Limiting the forum to
commercial advertising likely would be defensible. While the
audience is not physically "captive," as in the transit context, it is not
possible for citizens to avail themselves of the site's services without
exposure to the advertisements, as anyone who has had to wade
through countless annoying banner and box advertisements is aware.
Further limiting principles, such as only local businesses or only those
serving the tourist industry, probably would be upheld because they
relate to the broader web site purposes.
Several factors do suggest, however, that advertisement selection
is better characterized as government speech. The appearance of
government endorsement of its advertisers is similar to that of its
Internet links. An official web site conveys the authority and
imprimatur of the government, and that perception may be extended
to all information posted there, including advertisements. To the
extent the advertisers can be painted as sponsors of the official web
223. See, e.g., EGovNet, at http://www.egovnet.com (listing governments).
224. See, e.g., Wilson P. Dizard, III, Can the Government Make Web Ads Work?, ICN
(Apr. 1, 2002), at http://www.gen.com/21_7/manager/18280-1.html (noting that while
Hawaii and govAd terminated their agreement as ad revenue dried up, Maryland has just
started their own ad program); Jonathan GS Koppell, Will Cash-Strapped Government
Web Sites Jump on the Beleaguered Banner Bandwagon?, THE INDUSTRY STANDARD
(Feb. 5, 2001), at http://www.thestandard.. cle. (discussing phenomena generally, and
noting governments continuing need for money to support a sophisticated Internet
presence); William Welsh, Virginia Prepares to Open Door to Advertising on its Web Site,
WASHINGTON TECHNOLOGY, (Jan. 22, 2001), at
http://www.washingtontechnology.com/news/15_20/state/16203-1.html (discussing
Virginia's plan to start web ads, and Iowa's plans to look for web sponsors); Dibya Sarkar,
Mixed Messages, FCW.COM (Jan. 8, 2001), at http://www.fcw.com (analyzing business
structure and revenue potential, discussing govAd contracts and Massachusetts'
independent efforts to use web site ads).
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site, University of Missourim would be useful. Given that it posts the
ads, at least in some sense the government is the "speaker," although
that argument may be less persuasive with the written word via
computer than it was with spoken word on public radio. Again, it
would come down to the particular facts: the more it looks like
government acknowledging its sponsors, the closer to government
speech; the more it resembles transit advertisements, with advertisers
controlling the content and presentation, and a broad range of
speakers diluting the appearance of endorsement, the more it looks
like a public forum.26 In this context, the physical appearance would
matter significantly, in addition to the contractual and practical
realities.
There is less of a policy rationale for allowing government to
pick and choose among advertisers, as compared with Internet links,
however, because doing so is. less tied to government's expressive
purposes for its web site. Most likely, to retain any content control,
government's only choices will be to establish and maintain narrow
content limitations or, if the results are unacceptable, to abandon the
advertisement forum altogether.
CONCLUSION
As laid out in Part I, where use of its nonpublic property or funds
is deemed a limited public forum, government's stated ability to
establish content limitations is largely illusory. It is unable to exclude
speech that is divisive or contrary to public policy and general criteria,
such as speech that is inclusive or has broad appeal, may be struck
down as conducive to viewpoint discrimination. In a limited public
forum, government now has few options. It may legislate very
specific, narrow criteria designed to avoid controversy, such as
granting arts funding only to large established organizations or
allowing only neighborhood identifiers on street light pole banners.
It may attempt broad expressive goals and risk liability for every
policy decision. Or, it may simply close down the forum to all private
use.
These options do not fit the growing number of special public
225. KKK v. Curators of the Univ. of Mo., 203 F.3d 1085 (8th Cir.), cert. denied 531
U.S. 814 (2000).
226. See Welsh, supra note 224 (noting Iowa's plans to look for web sponsors). The
distinction, per Iowa's plan, is that "[u]nlike Internet advertising, which typically allows
users to click through to the advertiser's Web site, the sponsorships will limit advertisers to
displaying their name in exchange for partially subsidizing the site." Id.
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purpose forums or the increasing use of corporate sponsors for
government programs. Instead, these contexts are better served by
construing them as government speech, which would allow
government to determine the content of speech in its programs, even
when private speakers elaborate on its general themes.
This approach does raise a general policy concern over its
potential limitlessness. This Article has provided some specific means
for addressing the Court's cautions against suppressing viewpoints
and having a coercive effect. Namely, for special public purpose
forums, any rejections under the guise of government speech should
be clearly grounded in government's publicly announced expressive
purposes for the program. Also, viewpoint-based selections should
not be allowed in contexts where government subsidies are essential
to private speakers' continued operations. A more global concern is
that government can always provide some policy statement
manufacturing purported expressive goals for any program where it
provides funds or access to private speakers. The answer lies in
scrutiny of the context's characteristics. Where the context has little
to do with government presenting its views and images to the public,
as in meeting room use, or is primarily concerned with revenue-
raising, as in advertising forums, it will not merit designation as a
special public purpose forum. Sponsor acknowledgment, itself a
narrow category, does not create the same fears regarding its
boundaries.
Religious speech presents one final conundrum. If a program or
context is deemed government speech, including a religious speaker
may be seen as unconstitutional endorsement of a religious
227 th
message. On the other hand, if it is deemed a limited public forum,
rejection of religious speech will be held unconstitutional viewpoint
discrimination, as in Rosenberger. The predicament of government
lies in the uncertainty over how a given program or context will be
construed by a court. The answer will be necessarily case-by-case.
There may be some circumstances where government has discretion
to select which private speakers serve the expressive purposes for its
program, and yet is including a broad enough spectrum of private
227. See David Cole, Faith and Funding: Toward an Expressivest Model of the
Establishment Clause, 75 S. CAL. L. REV. 559 (2002) (asserting that the presence of
government speech should be the dividing line between acceptable government subsidies
of religiously-affiliated organizations and those that violate the Establishment Clause, so
that funding a drug treatment program, with its "just say no" message would be
unconstitutional, while funding a soup kitchen, which lacks a message component, would
be allowed as part of a neutral program).
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speech that doing so will not look like government endorsement of a
religious message. Consider if a city wanted to highlight community
institutions in its banner program. If it included churches along with
schools, hospitals and charitable institutions, that would both fit with
its policy and not be endorsement. Similarly, if a city website
included links to important cultural and architectural sites, inclusion
of suitable churches would be acceptable. The analysis is different
however, for sponsorship acknowledgments and any other context
that depends on endorsement as its rationale. Making sponsorship
acknowledgments that contain religious speech would cross that line,
and whether religious entities could be sponsors at all probably would
depend on how exclusive the group.
The proposed expansions of the government speech doctrine will
facilitate new additions to the speech market, and thus will serve First
Amendment values, as illustrated by one final example. In the
summer of 2002, the Chicago Department of Cultural Affairs
produced a city-wide special event entitled "Music Everywhere," 22
which consisted primarily of selected performers playing music on the
streets. It was publicly funded and heavily promoted as a tourist
attraction, so the organizers wanted to ensure high quality and
diverse musical offerings. Initially, there was some concern over how
this would affect existing street performers; 229 they could have argued
that the program was a limited public forum for street performers, so
that they, too, were entitled to participate and be paid by the city.
The established criteria of musical excellence and showcasing the
city's diversity allowed for discretionary selection, however. This
purely additive speech had no negative impact on freedom of speech.
Existing street performers are allowed on the sidewalks as a matter of
right, of course, not subject to control as to content or musical skills,
but only regulated as to hours, certain prohibited places, and level of
230
noise. Music Everywhere did not displace the private performers,
and they may even have benefited by the heightened awareness of
street music and the increase in people coming into the downtown
area to seek it out.
In sum, increasing governments' ability to fashion their own
228. Fran Spielman, Music Will Fill Streets of City This Summer, CHI. SUN-TIMES,
Mar. 23, 2002, at 5; Gary Washburn, What Can Top Cows? The Sound of Moo-sic, CHI.
TRIB., Mar. 23, 2002, at 1. The event was a sequel to the wildly successful Cows on Parade
of 1999, which was emulated by scores of municipalities. See id.
229. See Howard Reich, Street Musicians Get a Cold Shoulder from the City, Unless
They Are the Mayor's Own Chosen Minstrels, CHI. TRIB., Mar. 29, 2002, at C1.
230. See CHI., ILL. MUNICIPAL CODE § 4-268-050 (1992); id. § 11-4-1110 (1998).
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messages in the expanding context of public-private partnerships will
serve only to enhance First Amendment values by increasing
opportunities for speech activity, rather than suppressing or
threatening the existing free speech rights of individuals. For this
reason, special public purpose forums and sponsorship
acknowledgments should be considered government speech to allow
for discretionary selection, rather than be held to ever-narrowing
interpretations of viewpoint discrimination.
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